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I have been a stranger in a strange land.'
I. INTRODUCTION
We live in a world without true borders. Almost every facet of life crosses the
geographical boundaries of nations with ease. With the creation of the Internet,
communication across the world is easily accessible and instantaneous.2 The
1. Exodus 2:22 (King James).
2. See generally Sean Selin, Comment, Governing Cyberspace: The Need for an International Solution,
32 GoNz. L. REv. 365 (1996-1997); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr, Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT'L
LEGAL STUD. 155 (1997); James Alexander French and Rafael X. Zahralddin, The Difflculty of Enforcing Laws
in the Extraterritorial Internet, I NE uS J. OP. 99 (1996); see also Timothy S. Wu, Note, Cyberspace
Sovereignry?-The Internet and the International System, I0 HARv. J. L. &TECH. 647 (1997); see also Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Symposium on the Internet and Legal Theory: The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-
228
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 13
pollution from one country effects the environment of the entire world.3 The
formation of the International Criminal Court will bring violations of international
human rights laws to a new level.4 Commerce crosses geographical borders like
never before.5 These societal changes bring our world closer together. However,
there are prices to pay for this global community. One of the prices is that
foreigners who can enter a nation with such ease, can also break the law of that
nation.
When arrested in a foreign land, a foreign criminal is a stranger in a strange
land. He is subject to the laws and customs of that nation. However, he is also
protected by the customary principles of international law. One of these principles
is the right of a foreign national to contact his consulate upon detention or arrest in
a foreign land. As stated by the International Court of Justice, "the unimpeded
conduct of consular relations, which have also been established between peoples
since ancient times ... [is important in] promoting the development of friendly
relations among nations, and ensuring protection and assistance for aliens resident
in the territories of other states . ..."' The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations outlines this principle in Article 36.'
KENT L. REV. 997 (1998).
3. See generally George Richards, Environmental Labeling of Consumer Products: The Need for
International Harmonization of Standards Governing Third-Party Certification Programs, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 235 (1994).
4. See generally Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an International
Criminal Court, 33 COLu. J.TRANSNA&'LL. 73 (1995); see also Justice Richard Goldstone, 1998 Otto L. Walter
Lecture: International Human Rights at a Century's End, in 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 241 (1999); Patricia A.
McKeon, Note, An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle of Sovereignty Against the Demands
for International Justice, 12 St. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 535 (1997); Christopher J. McGrath, Today's Transnational
Crime Epidemic: The Necessity of an International Criminal Court to Battle Misdeeds Which Transcend National
Borders, 6 D.C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 135 (1997).
5. See generally Elissa Safer, Protecting Trade Secrets in a World Without Borders, 27-APR COLO. LAW.
67 (1998).
6. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 139 (1980) at 145-46.
7. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24,1963, 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261, TIAS No. 6820
[hereinafter the Treaty, the Vienna Convention, or the Convention]. Article Thirty-Six states in full:
Communication and Contact with Nationals of the Sending State
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relation to nationals of the sending
State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have
access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to
communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the
consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested
or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or
detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison,
custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal
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A consul provides assistance to a foreign national that the arresting government
could never offer. Consular officers provide understanding of the arresting
government's laws and customs.8
As a party to the Vienna Convention, the United States has vigorously
demanded enforcement of Article 36 when American citizens are detained abroad.9
However, the United States has a less than perfect record when it comes to
affording these rights to foreign nationals detained in America.' ° The United States
has ignored rulings from the International Court of Justice concerning its gross
violations of the Vienna Convention." American. courts have continually found
ways to keep from affording foreign nationals their rights under the Vienna
Convention. The Supreme Court has refused to rule on the matter, leaving the lower
federal and the state courts confused and divided.' 2 The United States has to
recognize that its citizens are not superior to the rest of the world. The United States
must fulfill its obligations under the Vienna Convention. To continue the violations
of the Convention is not only ignoring the United States' international obligations,
but is placing Americans at risk of the same violations when traveling abroad.
American attorneys must be aware of the applicability of the Vienna
Convention when representing foreign defendants. The majority of American cases
dealing with the Vienna Convention have been capital crimes, 3 immigration
representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in
prison, custody or detention of their district in pursuance of ajudgment. Nevertheless, consular
officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or
detention if he expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph I of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws
and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and
regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended.
8. See Mark J. Kaddish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search for the
Right to Consul, 18 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 565, 604-05 (1997); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Government of
Canada in Support of an Application for the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Case ofEx Parte Joseph Stanley Faulder
[hereinafter Canadian Amicus]; John Cary Sims & Linda E. Carter, Representing Foreign Nationals: Emerging
Importance of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as a Defense Tool, THE CHAMPION, SeptJOct. 1998,
at 28.
9. See infra Part H.A.2.a (discussing the adoption ofthe Vienna Convention in the United States); see also
infra Part H.B (discussing the United States' use of the Vienna Convention in Syria and Iran).
10. See infra Part MI, V (presenting the cases that apply the Vienna Convention).
11. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); LaGrand v. Stewart, 526 U.S. 111 (1999).
12. The Supreme Court denied certiorari for three foreign defendants. See, e.g., LaGrand v. Stewart, 526
U.S. 111 (1999); Faulder v. Johnson, 519 U.S. 995 (1996); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
13. See, e.g., LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998); Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97 (4th
Cir. 1997); Faulder v. Johnson, 81 .3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996); Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 445 S.E.2d
670 (1994); State v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7 (Del.Super.Ct. 1999).
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cases,' 4 and narcotics cases.15 Those cases have held that foreign defendants must
meet a number of requirements to invoke the Vienna Convention. First, the foreign
defendant must raise the issue in a timely manner.16 Second, the foreign defendant
must establish that the Vienna Convention establishes a private right for individuals
to enforce.'7 Third, the defendant must prove that he suffered actual prejudice from
the violation of his right to consular notification.'" Finally, the defendant must ask
for an appropriate remedy.' 9
This comment discusses the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the
United States courts' interpretation of that treaty. Part II explains the history and
formation of the Vienna Convention, its place in American law, and the United
States' use of it. Part III provides a detailed look at five of the precedent setting
cases dealing with the Vienna Convention in America. Part IV discusses the United
States Department of State handbook regarding consular notification and access.
Part V examines eight cases that began after the passage of the State Department
handbook to see how the courts are applying the Vienna Convention.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
1. Formation
Following the end of the Second World War, there was a growing realization
that the newly formed United Nations should attempt to.codify consular law.2" In
14. See, e.g., Waldron v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 17 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1994); United States
v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D.Ill. 1999).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D.I1U. 1999); United States v. Miranda, 65
F. Supp. 2d 1002 (D.Minn. 1999); United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp, 2d 178 (E.D.N.Y 1999).
16. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d. 615 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that in order for a foreign defendant to raise
the Vienna Convention on in a federal habeas corpus action, he must have first raised it in state court proceedings);
see also Reyes, 740 A.2d at 14-15 (holding that evidence obtained in violation of Reyes' Vienna Convention right
to consular notification will be suppressed because Inter alia he asserted the violation in a timely manner).
17. See infra Part V.A.
18. See infra Part V.B.
19. See infra Part V.C.
20. See LUKET. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 23 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing that the move to codify
consular law was part of the effort of the United Nations to move "towards the progressive development of
international law and its codification"). This is indicated in Article 13(1) of the Charter of the United Nations
which reads: "The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose
of... encouraging the progressive development in international law and its codification."!d. at n. 117; see also
Charterof the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 933,3 Bevans 1153, entered into force, Oct.
24, 1945.
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1949, the International Law Commission (ILC)2' determined that consular relations
was an area ripe for codification.2" In 1955, the ILC began examining the subject
of consular relations.23 Following the adoption of the Draft Articles on Consular
Relations, 24 the General Assembly of the United Nations announced that they would
convene a conference to form an international agreement on consular relations.2
5
Ninety-two nations assembled in Vienna, Austria from March 4,1963 to April 22,
1963 for the United Nations conference.26 The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations was created on April 24, 1963Y On March 19, 1967, the Vienna
Convention entered into force.2 To date, more than 160 countries have ratified the
Treaty. 29 In addition to the Vienna Convention, many countries have entered into
21. See International Law Commission (last modified Mar. 9, 2000) <http'//www.un.org/law/ilc/
introfra.htm>.
The International Law Commission was established by the General Assembly [of the United Nations]
in 1947 to promote the progressive development of international law and its codification. The
Commission, which meets annually, is composed of 34 members who are elected by the General
Assembly for five year terms and who serve in their individual capacity, not as representatives of their
Governments.
Most of the Commission's work involves the preparation of drafts on topics of international law. Some
topics are chosen by the Commission and others referred to it by the General Assembly or the
Economic and Social Council. When the Commission completes draft articles on a particular topic,
the General Assembly usually convenes an international conference of plenipotentiaries to incorporate
the draft articles into a convention which is then open to States to become parties.
22. See William 3. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs, and
Remedies. 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257,263 (1998).
23. See Kaddish, supra note 8, at 567 (discussing that the ILC began the work on the first draft in 1955
and completed and sent it out for comment in 1960); see also LEE, supra note 20, at 24. For an explanation of the
general purpose of consular relations; LEE, supra note 20, at 3 (discussing that consular institutions first
"developed out of the necessities of international trade"). "By generating a sense of security and confidence
conducive to trade, travel, and residence in foreign lands, the consul has grown in importance until today we find
consuls in almost all major cities of the world." Id.; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 7, Preamble (recalling
that "consular relations have been established between peoples since ancient times").
24. Aceves, supra note 22 at 257,263.
25. Kaddish, supra note 8; see also LEE supra note 20, at 24 (discussing that the ILC completed the first
draft on the subject of consular relations in 1960 and submitted it to the Member States for their comments). The
ILC adopted the final draft in 1961 and the United Nations General Assembly decided the following year to
convene a United Nations Conference on the subject in 1963. Id.
26. See LEE, supra note 20, at 24 (discussing that Vienna was chosen as the site for the convention because
the city had a rich history of consular relations and was even home to the Konsular-Akademie, which was founded
in 1754 with the purpose of training consuls).
27. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7; see also Kaddish, supra note 8, at 567.
28. Aceves, supra note 22, at 263.
29. See State Department. Pub. No. 10518, Consular Notiication and Access: Instructions for Federal,
State and Local Law Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the
Rights of Consular Officials to Assist Them (released Jan. 1998) at 42 [hereinafter Consular Notification and
Access or The Handbook].
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bilateral agreements dealing with consular relations to supplement the Vienna
Convention. 0
The purpose of the Treaty is to provide certain and consistent laws to govern
consuls." The Vienna Convention codifies the customary standards of international
law.32 The Treaty deals with various aspects of consular duties, including: the
general details of setting up a consul, the duties and privileges of the consul staff,
and the rights of the foreign nationals with respect to their consul.33 A specific
30. Id. (stating that one of the main purposes of the bilateral agreements is to mandate that the consulate
is to be notified immediately upon the arrest of one of their citizens, regardless of the national's wishes). The
handbook further states that the countries that have entered into bilateral agreements that require mandatory
notification have signed one of three treaties. lId Those three treaties may be found at TAIS 11083, 3 UST 3426,
and 19 UST 5018. Id.; see also Aceves, supra note 22, at 266 ( explaining that in addition to these bilateral
agreements, "the United States has also entered into agreements that contain a most favored nation clause with
respect to consular and diplomatic agents... [which] require the United States to treat the consular officials of
signatory countries no less favorably than consular officials from other countries"); LEE, supra note 20, at 134
(stating that prior to the adoption of the Vienna Convention, the United States relied primarily on bilateral
agreements and that twenty-eight of those agreements contained provisions guaranteeing the rights of detained
nationals to contact their consulate). Those agreements were with Algeria, China, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark,
Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Malaya, Muscat, The Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Phillippines, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, the
United Kingdom, and Vietnam. Id. But see Victor M. Uribe, Consuls at Work: Universal Instruments of Human
Rights and Consular Protection in the Context of Criminal Justice, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 375, 384 (1997)
(hypothesizing that the Vienna Convention is the most important instrument in the arena of consular relations);
see also LEE, supra note 20, at 26 (stating that "the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations . . . was
undoubtedly the single most important event in the entire history of the consular institution. Indeed, after 1963,
there can be no settlement ofconsular disputes or regulation of consular relations... without reference or recourse
to the Vienna Convention").
31. See Thomas Healy, Note: Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 1726, 1743 (1998) (explaining that the expansion of international trade following World War
II led world leaders to convene to draft the Vienna Convention).
32. Consular Notification and Access, supra note 29, at 42; see also LEE, supra note 20, at 4-23 (tracing
the history of consular relations back to the ancient Greek city-states, through the Roman Empire, the expansion
of international trading following the Crusades, on into the Middle Ages, through the opening of Asia to Western
trade during the nineteenth century, the bilateral agreements of the early twentieth century, and ending in the
formation of the Vienna Convention); B. SEN, A DIPLOMAT'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONALLAW AND PRACTICE
334-35 (3d rev. ed. 1988) (stating that one such provision of customary international law was the Doctrine of
Minimum Standard of Treatment which was developed in the 19th and early 20th centuries).
[It] was based on the principle that although a state was not obligated to admit foreign nationals into
its territory, but once a state agreed to admit an alien ti was bound to accord him a certain standard of
treatment which would be in keeping with the notions of justice, irrespective of the manner in which
it treated its own nationals. It meant principally that in the matter of personal liberty and property
rights of aliens, the receiving state was required to provide for certain minimum safeguards; and if it
failed to do so it would be answerable to the home state of the aggrieved alien which could take up his
cause in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection.
Id.; Philippe J. Sands, The Future ofInternational Adjudication, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1999) (stating that
"most of [the Vienna Convention's] provisions are generally considered to reflect customary international law").
33. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 7.
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privilege afforded to foreign nationals, detailed in Article 36 of the Treaty, is the
right to contact one's consulate when arrested or detained by the local authorities. 4
A primary task of consuls is to render assistance to their citizens. Consular
access and assistance become particularly indispensable when foreign
nationals face prosecution, sentencing, incarceration, or death under local
legal systems. '[F]reedom of communication between consuls and their
nationals may be regarded as so essential to the exercise of consular
functions that its absence would render meaningless the establishment of
consular functions.'
35
A national's communication with his consulate upon detention is "essential to
guard against the possible mistreatment of prisoners, and to facilitate the
presentation of an effective legal defense by those possibly facing serious chargeg
in a language they do not understand under a legal system with which they are
unfamiliar."36 Consular officers provide various useful services for their detained
nationals. Consuls contact the national's family to offer assistance and comfort.
37
Furthermore, versed with the national's language, consuls are better equipped to
explain foreign legal systems as well as the statements and desires of the national
to authorities.38 What is more, the consul can better understand the cultural
differences that exist between the two countries.39 In short, a consular official
34. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 36; see also Kaddish, supra note 8, at 569-71 (discussing
the history of Article 36 and the meaning of terms used within it, such as "detained" and "arrest," that were not
defined in the text of the Vienna Convention, but were defined by the Department of State's Foreign Affairs
Manual); LEE, supra note 20, at 133 (recognizing that one of the chief functions of a consul is to communicate
with their nationals when they have been detained in prison): Canadian Amicus, supra note 8, at 12 (discussing
that Article 36 also confers a duty upon nations to protect their own citizens when problems arise in a foreign
land).
35. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Massachusetts Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers and Amnesty International as Amici Curiae In Support of Appellant, United States v.
Ben Lin at 11 [hereinafter Ben Lin Amicus], quoting LEE, supra note 20 (stating further that there are numerous
other sources of international law that reinforce a right to consular assistance such as the UN Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (ECOSOC res. 663 (1957)), The Body of Principles for the Protection ofAll
Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (U.N.GA. 43113 (1988)), UN Rulesfor the Protection
of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty, (U.N.G.A. Res. 45/113 (1990)), UN Declaration on the Human Rights of
Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live (U.N.G.A. Res. 40/144 (1985)), and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M). Id. at 11-13.
36. See Sims and Carter, supra note 8, at 28, 30 (stating further that "[c]onsular officials have a strong
interest in the well-being of their nationals who are visiting or living in a foreign country .... All governments
want to monitor the criminal prosecutions of their nationals to ensure fair treatment").
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provides assistance that can prove invaluable in understanding the judicial system
and rights contained therein and in obtaining a proper defense.'
2. The Vienna Convention in the United States
a. Adoption
The United States signed the Vienna Convention on April24,1963," the Senate
approved membership on October 22, 1969,42 and President Nixon ratified it on
November 12, 1969. 3 The treaty officially entered into force in the United States
on December 24, 1969.44 The Vienna Convention was never codified by federal
statute because it is a self-executing treaty.45 In demonstrating the importance of the
Vienna Convention, the United States Department of Justice and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) codified the consular notification components of
the Vienna Convention. 46
b. Place of Treaties in the United States
i. Supremacy Clause
"A treaty is 'an agreement between two or more states or international
organizations that is intended to be legally binding and is governed by international
40. See Canadian Amicus, supra note 8, at 10. Canada's Brief intimates that the typical situation involves
a foreign national
who is not relatively sophisticated, or who lacks strong connections in the arresting community, is
especially vulnerable to making dangerously uninformed choices in exercising even the rights of which
the arresting authorities do inform him. He is therefore almost certain to be unable to avail himself of
rights of which the arresting authorities fail to inform him. Finally, with no one to explain his
predicament in the context of the more familiar system of his home country, a detained foreign national
is at a considerable disadvantage in establishing a defense.
Id.
41. Aceves, supra note 23, at 267.
42. Jd. at 268.
43. See id. at 267-68 (noting that although the United States signed the Treaty in 1963, President Nixon
did not automatically submit the Treaty to Congress for approval because he was originally intending to rely on
bilateral consular agreements, but that the administration finally submitted it because the Vienna Convention
"constitutes an important contribution on the development and codification of international law and should
contribute to the orderly and effective conduct of consular relations between the States." (quoting Ex. E. 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., at Vii (Statement of Secretary of State William Rogers)).
44. let at 269; see also Consular Notiflcation and Access, supra note 29, at 42, (describing that prior to
the adoption of the Vienna Convention, the United States was involved in consular relations with other nations).
45. See infra Part ILA.2.b.ii; see also Consular Notification and Access, supra note 29, at 42 (instructing
that it is self-executing because the authorities can "implement these obligations through their existing powers").
46. See infra Part H.A.2.c.i. and Part H.A.2.c.ii.
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law.' 47 Article VI, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States... and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made,... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound .... ,48 A treaty's authority is comparable in American law to
a federal statute.49 Like a federal statute, a treaty binds the individual states50 and
it may not contradict the Constitution.
ii. Self-Executing
A treaty is self-executing in that it is effective immediately without the
necessity of ancillary legislation, court action or any implementing action. Chief
Justice Marshall in Foster v. Neilson52 set out the original principle that
47. See Louis Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US CONsTrrIION, 2D ED. (1996) at 184-85 & n.36
quoting RESTATEMENT (n.2 to Preface) § 301 adapting Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Treaty is defined as:
A compact made between two or more independent nations with a view to the public welfare. An
agreement, league, or contract between two or more nations or sovereigns, formally signed by
commissioners properly authorized, and solemnly ratified by the several sovereigns or the supreme
power of each state. A treaty is not only a law but also a contract between two nations and must, if
possible, be so construed as to give full force and effect to all its parts. The term has a far more
restricted meaning under U.S. Constitution than under international law.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1502 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900) (stating that "[i]ntemationa law is part of our law").
48. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also Sims & Carter, supra note 8, at 29 (declaring that "state officials are
duty-bound to comply with the [Vienna Convention]").
49. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the
same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be
the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other.").
50. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957). There is nothing in the language of the Supremacy
Clause
which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution. Nor is there anything in the debates which accompanied the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution which even suggests such a result .... There is nothing new or
unique about what we say here. This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of
the Constitution over a treaty. For example, in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,267, 10 S.Ct. 295,297,
33 L.Ed. 642, it declared: 'The treaty power, as expressed in the constitution, is in terms unlimited
except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government or
of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States.
It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the constitution forbids, or a
change in the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a session of any portion
of the territory of the latter, without its consent.'
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
51. But see Molora Vadnais, A Diplomatic Morass: An Argument Against Judicial Involvement in Article
36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 47 UCLA L. REV. 307,322-32 (1999) (discussing whether
actions of the federal government that would tend to force the states to comply with the consular notifications
portions of Article 36 would be constitutional or not, under such precedence as Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920), Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).
52. 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
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A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act.
It does not generally effect, or itself, the object to be accomplished,
especially so are as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into
execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the
instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our
constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is consequently,
to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.53
In determining whether or not a treaty is self-executing, courts look to both the
intent of the signatory parties, as evidenced by the language of the instrument and
to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the treaty.
54
However, some United States state officials have conveyed that they do not feel
that the Vienna Convention binds them.
55
c. Codification and Adoption by Federal Agencies and Departments
The right of foreign nationals to be informed of their right to consular
assistance has been adopted or codified by many federal agencies and departments.
For example, the United States Department of Justice and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service have codified the provisions of Article 36.56 In addition, the
United States Department of State made a notable contribution by creating a manual
outlining United States obligations under the Convention.
57
i. United States Department of Justice
The United States Department of Justice codified the consular notification for
arrests and detention in title twenty-eight of the Code of Federal Regulations
Section 50.5. Under this rule, every time the Department of Justice detains or
53. Id. at 314.
54. Id. at 310-16.
55. See Amnesty International, United States of America: Violation of the Rights of Foreign Nationals
Under Sentence of Death (January 1998), available in AI Index: AMR 51/01/98 and <http://www.amnesty.it
ailiblaipubl1998AMRI25100198.htn> (explaining that shortly before the execution of frineo Tristan Montoya,
a Mexican national who did not understand English and was admittedly not afforded his rights to consular
assistance despite the fact that authorities knew he was Mexican, Texas officials responded to the U.S. State
Department that Texas authorities would refuse to "investigate the violation or to assess its possible impact, on
the grounds that Texas was not a signatory to the Vienna Convention").
56. See infa Part IV.
57. Consular Notification and Access, supra note 29, discussed infra at Part IV.
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arrests a foreign national, the Department official must inform the foreign national
of his right to contact his consulate.5 8 Section 50.5 provides:
(1) In every case in which a foreign national is arrested the arresting
officer shall inform the foreign national that his consul will be advised of
his arrest unless he does not wish such notification to be given. If the
foreign national does not wish to have his consul notified, the arresting
officer shall also inform him that in the event there is a treaty in force
between the United States and his country which requires such notification,
his consul must be notified regardless of his wishes and, if such is the case,
he will be advised of such notifications by the U.S. Attorney.
(2) In all cases (including those where the foreign national has stated
that he does not wish his consul to be notified) the local office of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation or the local Marshal's office, as the case
may be, will inform the nearest U.S. Attorney of the arrest and of the
arrested person's wishes regarding consular notification.
(3) The U.S. Attorney shall then notify the appropriate consul except
where he has been informed that the foreign national does not desire such
notification to be made. However, if there is a treaty provision in effect
which requires notification of consul, without reference to a demand or
request of the arrested national, the consul shall be notified even if the
arrested person has asked that he not be notified. In such case, the U.S.
Attorney shall advise the foreign national that his consul has been notified
and inform him that notification was necessary because of the treaty
obligation. 9
ii. Immigration and Naturalization Service
The INS codified the consular notification requirement in 8 Code of Federal
Regulations § 236.1(e):
(e) Privilege of communication. Every detained alien shall be notified that
he or she may communicate with the consular or diplomatic officers of the
country of his or her nationality in the United States .... When notifying
58. 28 C.F.R. Section 50.5.
59. l; see also Aceves, supra note 22, at 273-74 (discussing the adoption of the consular notification
provisions of Article 36 by the Justice Department); Bennett v. U.S., 2000 WL 10213 at *1 (arguing that the
Vienna Convention and 28 C.F.R. Section 50.5 were violated by the failure of the government to inform him of
his right to consular assistance); U.S. v. Briscoe, 69 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741 (1999) (claiming that FBI agents
violated 28 C.F.R. Section 50.5 by neglecting to inform him of his right of consular notification). U.S. v. Carrillo
and U.S. v. Superville, discussed supra Part V.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 13
consular or diplomatic officials, Service officers shall not reveal the fact
that any detained alien has applied for asylum or withholding of removal. 60
iii. United States Department of State
The United States Department of State has taken two major steps to inform
local governments of the consular notification aspects of the Vienna Convention.
First, the Department issued periodic notices to local governments explaining the
requirements. 1 Second, the Department issued a handbook detailing the
requirements of the Vienna Convention and answering questions that local
authorities might have about the implementation of the Convention.62 In addition
to informing local authorities of the Vienna Convention requirements, the
Department has also integrated the provisions in the manuals issued to American
Diplomatic staff abroad.63
The Department of State outlined the provisions of Article 36 in its Foreign
Affairs Manual which states in pertinent part, "Article 36 of the Vienna Consular
Convention provides that the host government must notify the arrestee without
delay of the arrestee's right to communicate with the American consul." 64 In 1986,
the Department of State released a bulletin to law enforcement agencies that
outlined those provisions of the Vienna Convention that the Department later
incorporated into the Department of State handbook. That bulletin set forth the
following instructions for government officials: "[t]he arresting official should in
all cases immediately inform the foreign national of his right to have his
government notified concerning the arrest/detention. If the foreign national asks
that such notification be made, you should do so without delay by informing the
nearest consulate or embassy."
60. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2000). The following countries are to be immediately notified (meaning within
seventy-two hours of the arrest or detention) even if the alien does not request such notification: Albania, Antigua,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Brunei, Bulgaria, People's Republic of China (unless
it's a Taiwan national carrying a Republic of China passport in which case, the office of the Taiwan Economic
and Cultural Representative's Office), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominica, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia,
Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Hungary, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Malta,
Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, St. KittslNevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent/Grenadines, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad/Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom (including British
dependencies of Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, Bermuda, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos
Islands), U.S.S.R. (including U.S.S.R. successor states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan), Uzbekistan,
Zambia). Id. § 236.1(c) n.1.
61. See Kaddish, supra note 8, at 599 (discussing United States Department of State Notice, October 1986).
62. Consular Notification and Access, supra note 29, discussed infra at Part IV.
63. Id.
64. U.S. Dep't. of State, 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 411.1 (1984), reprinted in Kaddish, supra note 8, at
599.
65. See Kaddish, supra note 8, at 599 (discussing United States Department of State Notice, October 1986).
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B. United States' Use of the Vienna Convention
In October of 1973, the United States Department of State clarified its position
by stating that "in the Department's view, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
contains obligations of the highest order and should not be dealt with lightly."66 The
United States takes advantage of the Vienna Convention in securing the rights of
and gaining access to detained American citizens abroad. 67 The treaty has also been
used to resolve and seek redress for hostage situations. 8
1. Syrian Case
In 1975, Syrian security forces detained two American citizens.69 Syrian
officials refused to give the United States consular officials access to the detained
nationals.7 0 The State Department notified the United States Embassy in Damascus
of their responsibility to inform the Syrian government of the importance of
consular access. 7' According to the State Department, the right of consular access
is well established under the Vienna Convention, customary international law,
bilateral agreements between the United States and Syria, and by humanitarian
considerations.72 The Department of State added that American authorities would
immediately notify the Syrian consulate if the American government detained a
Syrian national in the United States.7 3 Following the formal request by the United
66. Aceves supra note 22, at 270, quoting U.S. Dep't of State File LJM/SCA, reprinted in Arthur Rovine,
U.S. Dep't of State, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 161 (1973); see also Uribe, supra note
30, at 387 (discussing that even prior to the adoption of the Vienna Convention, the United States would argue
for consular officers to be given access to detained American citizens overseas). During a situation that arose in
Germany prior to the Vienna Convention, "[t]he State Department instructed the United States Embassy to
transmit to the German government its belief that the consul should be granted access to their nationals according
to what the U.S. Government considered to be the accepted international practice .... in order that the Consular
Officers may render them the assistance to which they by be entitled." Id. (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
67. See Canadian Amicus, supra note 8, at 30 (stating that "the United States Department of State has
instructed its consular posts around the world to file an immediate protest if another country fails to notify the
United States consular post within 12 hours of the arrest of a United States citizen") (emphasis added), quoting
United States Dep't of State File L.M.SCA; United States Dep't of State, Digest, 1973, p. 168; see also LEE, supra
note 20, at 144. Before the Vienna Convention was even in effect, nations and nationals were using it to secure
consular access to detained nationals. In 1964, a Harvard graduate student was arrested in Poland and he was
allowed to contact the American Consulate and consuls were given permission to see him three days after his
detention; Sims & Carter, supra note 8, at 30 (noting that "the United States has long been an aggressive user of,
and advocate for, the Vienna Convention").
68. See infra Part II.B.1 and Part lI.B.2.
69. Aceves supra note 22, at 270.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also Uribe, supra note 20, at 395-98 (arguing that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
also serves as a basis for consular officials to complain when their foreign nationals are denied the right to
consular assistance).
73. Id.
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States, the Syrian government allowed the detained Americans to speak with their
consul.74
2. Iran Hostage Situation
In November of 1979, Iranian students occupied the United States Embassy in
Tehran and detained a large number of United States citizens. 75 The students, led
by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, demanded that the United States extradite the
Shah of Iran back to Iran before the students would release the hostages.76 In
America's condemnation of Iran's refusal to allow consular access to the hostages,
the United States continually referred to the Vienna Convention.'
The treaty was part of the groundwork for proceedings the United States
brought in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on November 29, 1979.78 On
December 15, 1979, the ICJ issued an Order of Provisional Measures which
acknowledged the importance of the Vienna Convention and the right of consular
access.79 In its final decision, the ICJ stated in its decision that the hostages were
not allowed to contact their government.' This was in violation of the Vienna
Convention.8
II. PRE-HANDBOOK CASES
Although the United States strongly demanded access to American citizens
detained abroad, its record under the Vienna Convention has been less than
74. /,.
75. See Aceves, supra note 22, at 271; see also H. Lee Hetherington, Negotiating Lessons From Iran:
Synthesizing Langdell & MacCrate, 44 CATH. U.L. REV. 675, 688-89 (1988); case concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) 1980 I.CJ. 3, 12.
76. See Hetherington, supm note 75, at 687-92 (explaining that the United States adnitted the exiled Shah
for cancer treatment). The Shah, a longtime ally of America, had targeted the Ayatollah Khomeini during the early
1960s while the Shah was still in power in Iran. Id. In 1964, the Shah had exiled Ayatollah Khomeini for speaking
out against a one-sided agreement that granted American nationals sweeping immunity from Iranian law, yet made
Iranians answerable to Americans for the slightest transgression .... Over this issue, Khomeini established
himself as a critic of the Shah and the Shah's imperialistic coconspirator, the United States .... Over time,
Khomeini became recognized as a major leader of the Shah's opposition. Id. at 692.
77. Id.; see also Aceves, supra note 22, at 271.
78. Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures, 1979 I.CJ. 7, reprinted in 19 .L.M. 139; see also 18 I.L.M. 1464 and 1482;
see also Aceves, supra note 22, at 271.
79. See Aceves, supra note 22, at 271.
80. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) 1980 I.CJ. 3,
14.
81. Seeidat32.
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perfect.82 For example, in capital crimes, it is estimated that more than eighty
foreign nationals from more than twenty countries have been arrested, tried, and
convicted in the United States without being informed of their right to consular
assistance.13 In recent years, the United States' consistent violations have been
throughly examined in both immigration and capital cases involving foreign
nationals.84
A. Immigration Cases
1. United States v. Calderon-Medina
In United States v. Calderon-Medina,85 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
heard appeals from the government regarding the dismissal of two indictments for
illegal re-entry following deportation.86 This district court found that the INS had
violated title eight of the Code of Federal Regulations section 242.2(e) which
codified the consular notification aspects of the Vienna Convention. The court laid
down the following test for determining whether or not a violation made a
deportation unlawful: "[v]iolation of a regulation renders a deportation unlawful
82. The Consular Notification stated:
The obligations of consular notification and access apply to United States citizens in foreign countries
just as they apply to foreign nationals in the United States. When U.S. citizens are arrested or detained
abroad, the United States Department of State seeks to ensure that they are treated in a manner
consistent with these instructions, and that U.S. consular officers can similarly assist them. It is
therefore particularly important that federal, state, and local government officials in the United States
comply with these obligations with respect to foreign nationals here.
Consular Notification and Access, supra note 29, at 13; see also U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing
#46 of Wednesday, April 15, 1998 (stating that the United States was concerned that the execution of a
Paraguayan national who was denied his rights under the Treaty, would lead the international community to feel
that the United States did not hold the Treaty in high regard, since Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, is
"concerned about making sure that American citizens get the consular notification they deserve because, in many
parts of the world, that is particularly important").
83. See Death Penalty Information Center, Foreign Nationals and the Death Penalty in the United States,
Information Provided by Mark Warren of Amnesty International, available at <http://www.essential.org/
dpic/foreignnatl.html> (noting that as of January 1, 2000, the following countries had citizens on death row:
Mexico, Argentina, Germany, Peru, Canada, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Lebanon, United Kingdom, France, Thailand, el
Salvador, Vietnam, Cambodia, Honduras, Laos, Spain, Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iraq, Estonia, Iran,
Poland, Trinidad, Guyana, Philippines, Jamaica and Columbia). There are also unconfirmed reports of nationals
from Guatemala and Costa Rica. Id. Those nationals are being held in the following jurisdictions: (total number
of foreign nationals on death row in that jurisdiction are included in parentheses) Texas (24), California (23),
Arizona (6), Florida (7), Ohio (4), Oklahoma (3), Nevada (2), Illinois (3), Washington (2), Arkansas (1), Delaware
(1), Montana (1), Louisiana (1), Pennsylvania (1), Virginia (1), Oregon (1), Federal (1). Id; see also Amnesty
International Report, AMR 51/01198, United States ofAmerica: Violation of Rights of Foreign Nationals Under
Sentence of Death (January 1998).
84. See infra Parts Ill.A.1; II.A.2; llI.A.3; m.B.I; III.B.2; and III.B.3.
85. United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
86. d at 530.
87. Id; see also supra Part I.A.2.c.ii (discussing the INS' codification of the Vienna Convention).
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only if the violation prejudiced interests of the alien which were protected by the
regulation."8 The court remanded the case8 9 so the two defendants would "be
allowed the opportunity to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the INS regulation
violations .... If either alien shows such prejudice, the indictment against him may
be dismissed." 9
2. United States v. Rangel-Gonzales
Following remand,91 the trial court found that Rangel-Gonzales did not suffer
prejudice by the INS's failure to advise him of his right to consular assistance.92 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied the prejudice standard set forth in Calderon-
Medina.93
The court noted that the defendants bear the burden of proving prejudice.94 In
his affidavit, the defendant indicated that he did not know of his right to contact his
consulate and that he would have contacted them if he had known of this right.9
The Mexican Consul General of Seattle stated that "his office would visit an alien
who called for help, would help him contact friends and an attorney, and might even
send a Consular representative to the deportation hearing."96 The defendant also
submitted an affidavit from an immigration attorney who stated that with proper
assistance, Rangel-Gonzales could have obtained a voluntary departure.97
88. Calderon-Medina, 591 F2d. at 531 (remarking that the "regulation admittedly violated here was
evidently intended to ensure compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations... [which] provides
that aliens shall have freedom to communicate with consular officers of their nationality ... .
89. Il at 530. U.S. v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980), was the companion case of
Calderon-Medina.
90. Id. at 532 (enunciating the standard of prejudice to be whether the violation "harmed the aliens'
interests in such a way as to affect potentially the outcome of their deportation proceedings."). But see Calderon-
Medina, 591 F.2d at 532 (Takasugi, L, dissenting).
This nation must manifest integrity in our treaties with foreign countries. To honor the provisions of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, as noted in footnote 6 of the majority
opinion, mandates a sense of justice and decency. To do anything less is a severe erosive compromise
of our very essence equal if not greater than a Constitutional violation.
For the foregoing reasons, I order an affirmance of the district court decision, or in the alternative, to
remand the case to the district court imposing the burden on the government to establish the absence
of prejudice.
91. See Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d. at 532 (remanding the cases for further lower court proceedings to
determine whether or not the defendants were prejudiced by the violation of their Vienna Convention rights).
92. United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529,530 (9th Cir. 1980).
93. See supra Part HI.A.1.
94. See Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d. at 530 (holding that the "initial burden of production is on the
defendant"). The court stated that it was clear from the language of Calderon-Medina, which stated that "the
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"[V]arious family members and legal and social service groups stated that had they
knew of the appellant's difficulties they would have been of assistance to him."98
The Ninth Circuit found that these affidavits "made a prima facie showing of
prejudice within the meaning of Calderon-Medina."
3. Waldron v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
In WaIdron v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Second Circuit
reviewed a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that upheld an
immigration judge's (D) finding of deportability.'00 In Waldron's second appeal to
the BIA, he alleged, inter alia, "that the INS and the U abused their discretion by
not notifying him of his right to contact diplomatic officials of his native Trinidad
',101
The Second Circuit had previously instituted a no prejudice standard when the
INS fails "to adhere to its own regulations regarding an alien's right to counsel in
deportation hearings ..... 102 The court refused to extend the no prejudice standard
to cases that did not involve "fundamental rights derived from the Constitution or
federal statutes, such as the right to counsel." ' 0 3 The court established
that when a regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental right
derived from the Constitution or a federal statute, and the INS fails to
adhere to it, the challenged deportation proceeding is invalid and a remand
to the agency is required .... On the other hand, where an INS regulation
does not affect fundamental rights derived from the Constitution or federal
statute, we believe it is best to invalidate a challenged proceeding only
upon a showing of prejudice to the rights sought to be protected by the
subject regulation.I'
98. aid
99. Id. (finding that the "appellant did show some likelihood that had the regulation been followed his
defense and the conduct of the hearing would have been materially affected").
100. Waldron v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 17 F.3d 511, 512 (2d Cir.1994) (finding
specifically that Waldron was deportable for two drug convictions).
101. la at 514. Waldron was served by the INS while he was serving a prison term in 1985 with an Order
to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing that charged him as deportable. Id at 513. The U determined that Waldron
was deportable because of his drug convictions and that he was unable to demonstrate good moral character that
would have made him eligible for suspension of deportation. Id Waldron appealed this finding to the BIA, who
ordered a rehearing. Id at 514. The first time Waldron asked for counsel was during his second deportation
hearing. ld. at 513-14. The IJ again determined that Waldron was deportable for his drug convictions. Id. at 514.
Waldron appealed this decision pro se and raised the issue of consular notification which is reviewed in this
opinion. Id
102. Id. at 517 (applying Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1991)).
103. Id at 518 (finding that the prejudice standard articulated in Calderon-Medina should apply in non
fundamental rights cases only).
104. Id. (articulating the reason for the different treatment is that it wduld place too high of a "burden on
the agency's adjudication of immigration cases").
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The court went on to find that the right to consular notification did not
"implicate fundamental rights with constitutional or federal statutory origins...
.105 The court refused to equate a treaty obligation with fundamental rights, such
as the right to counsel.1 6 Because these rights did not implicate a fundamental right
and Waldron could not demonstrate any prejudice caused by the violation, the
Second Circuit upheld the deportation. 7
B. Capital Cases
1. Angel Breard
In 1992, Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan national, was arrested by
Virginia authorities and charged with murder and attempted rape. '°8 After refusing
a plea bargain and testifying on his own behalf, Breard was convicted and sentenced
to death.'09 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari."1 After seeking review of his conviction
and sentence, Breard filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging, among other
things, that he had never been informed of his right to contact the Paraguayan
consul."' This was the first time Breard raised this claim."
2
The district court denied Breard's petition." 3 The court, although concerned
with Virginia's refusal to abide by the Vienna Convention, found that Breard had
procedurally defaulted his claim by not raising it in state court.' 4 The Court of
105. Id. (stating that the statutory provision in question, Section 242.2(g) was enacted to "ensure compliance
with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations" and specifically the rights recited in Article 36, "that aliens
shall have the freedom to communicate with consular authorities of their native country").
106. I. (stating that the right to counsel had its basis in the concept of due process).
107. Id. at 518-19.
108. See Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 72-73, cert. denied 513 U.S. 971(1994) (recounting the
specific facts of the crime); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529,532-38 (1999); Jonathan I. Charney and W. Michael Reisman, Breard: The
Facts, 92 AJ.I.L. 666 (1998).
109. See Breard, 248 Va. at 73; see also Bradley, supra note 108, at 533 (commenting that Breard testified
against the advice of his lawyers and that he "admitted to having committed the murder, for which he blamed a
Satanic curse placed on him by his father-in-law').
110. See Breard, 248 Va. 68 (1994).
111. See Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1260 (E.D.Va. 1996).
112. See id. at 1263 (stating that "Petitioner never raised this issue in state court [and tiherefore, the claim
is defaulted and federal review is barred").
113. See id. at 1269 (dismissing Breard's claims with prejudice).
114. See id, (stating that "Virginia's persistent refusal to abide by the Vienna Convention troubles the
Court," but that the claim was procedurally defaulted). The court further stated that they felt a competent attorney
should have discovered the violation of the Vienna Convention during the state proceedings. Id. "Attorney
ignorance or inadvertence is not 'cause' because the attorney is the petitioner's agent acting, or failing to act, in
furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must bear the risk of any attorney error." Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991) (citations omitted).
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Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.11 5 One circuit court judge concurred in the
judgment in order to emphasize the importance of the Vienna Convention." 6
While Breard's appeals were pending, the Republic of Paraguay brought suit
in federal district court against the Commonwealth of Virginia, alleging violations
of the Vienna Convention and the Treaty of Friendship."' Paraguay argued that
because of the treaty violations, the court should vacate Breard's conviction." 8
115. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998). The court explained that defendants must raise
claims during state proceedings before they can be raised in federal proceedings because "the state courts [have]
the first opportunity to consider alleged constitutional errors occurring in a state prisoner's trial and sentencing."
Id. at 619. "To exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner must fairly present the substance of his claim to the
state's highest court." d. "Under Virginia law, 'a petitioner is barred from raising any claim in a successive
petition if the facts as to that claim were either known or available at the time of his original petition.' Hoke v.
Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1354 n.1 (4th Cir. 1996) (quotes omitted)." ld. Breard argued that he did not have a
reasonable basis for raising the Vienna Convention claim until after the Fifth Circuit decided Faulder v. Johnson,
and because the Virginia authorities did not inform him of his rights under the Convention. Id The Fourth Circuit,
however, was bound to follow Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 197 (1998), where the petitioner argued that the
novelty of the Vienna Convention and the lack of notification justified his failure to raise the claim in state court.
Id. In that case, the court
noted that a reasonably diligent attorney would have discovered the applicability of the Vienna
Convention to a foreign national defendant... [because the Vienna Convention] has been in effect
since 1969 .... Treaties are one of the first sources that would be consulted by a reasonably diligent
counsel representing a foreign national. Counsel in other cases.., apparently had and have had no
difficulty whatsoever learning of the Convention.
kd at 619-20. In order for Breard to raise the Vienna Convention claim in federal proceedings after procedurally
defaulting, he would have to demonstrate cause for the default. Id. at 620. Cause is defined as "'some objective
factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel's efforts' to raise the claim in state court at the appropriate
time."' Id, citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488. The court determined that Breard could not establish
cause. Id.
116. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d at 621-22 (Butzner, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the language of
the Vienna Convention "is mandatory and unequivocal, evidencing the signatories' recognition of the importance
of consular access for persons detailed by a foreign government"). The "Supremacy Clause mandates that rights
conferred by a treaty be honored by the states .... The protections afforded by the Vienna Convention... cannot
be overstated. It should be honored by all nations that have signed the treaty and all states of this nation." Id.
117. See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1271-72 (1996).
118. Id. at 1272. Paraguay asked for the following relief:
1. Declare that defendants violated the Vienna Convention and Friendship Treaty by failing to
notify plaintiff's of Breard's arrest.
2. Declare that defendants continue to violate both treaties by failing to afford plaintiffs a
meaningful opportunity to give Breard assistance during the proceedings against him.
3. Declare Breard's conviction void.
4. Enjoin defendants from taking any action based on the conviction and declare that any further
action based on the conviction is a continuing violation of the treaties.
5. Grant an injunction vacating Breard's conviction and directing defendants to abide by the treaties
during any future proceedings against Breard.
Id.
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The district court, although troubled by the violation of the Vienna Convention,
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 19 The Court of Appeals
affirmed.1 20 Paraguay and Breard both filed a writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court.
21
Simultaneously, Paraguay filed suit against the United States in the ICJ.22 The
ICJ issued the following provisional measures: "The United States should take all
measures at its disposal to that ensure the Angel Francisco Breard is not executed
pending the final decision of these proceedings, and should inform the [ICJ] of all
the measures which it has taken in the implementation of this Order.
''23
Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court invited the United States
Department of Justice to submit a brief to the Court expressing the views of the
Department on the matter. 24 The Department of Justice conceded that a violation
had occurred, but nonetheless, asked the Court to deny the certiorari motions
because the United States had already administered the proper diplomatic remedy
to Paraguay.' 2s Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, in a letter to Virginia
Governor, James Gilmore, requested that the Governor voluntarily stay the
execution.126
119. The district court held they did not have subject matterjurisdiction based on the Eleventh Amendment.
"The text of the amendment divests this Court of jurisdiction over actions against a state by 'Citizens of another
State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.' U.S. Const. Amend XI. This language was soon interpreted
to prohibit other actions against a state in federal court." Paraguay v. Allen, F. Supp. at 1271. "Although this
Court is disenchanted by Virginia's failure to embrace and abide by the principles embodied in the Vienna
Convention and Friendship Treaty, the Eleventh Amendment operates to bar retroactive relief." Id. at 1273.
120. See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d at 622.
121. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
122. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), I.C.J. (Apr. 9,
1998), available in 37 I.L.M. 810 (1998). Paraguay asked the ICJ to declare that the United States has violated
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention and to order the United States to vacate Breard's conviction. Id, Paraguay
further requested that the ICJ indicate provisional measures directing the United States to ensure Virginia did not
execute Breard pending the outcome of the case. Id.; see also Christopher E. van der Waerden, Note, Death and
Diplomacy: Paraguay v. United States and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 45 WAYNE L. REv.
1631, 1638 (1999).
In its application to the ICJ, Paraguay asserted that without the aid of his consulate, Breard, "made a
number of objectively unreasonable decision during the criminal proceedings against him, which were
conducted without translation" and he "did not comprehend the fundamental differences between the
criminal justice systems of the United States and Paraguay." Id citing Case Concerning the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, Request for indication of Provisional Measures (Para. v. U.S.)
(Order of Apr. 9, 1998).
Id.
123. Case Concerning the VCCR (Para. v. United States), I.C.J. (Apr. 9, 1998).
124. See Bradley, supra note 108, at 537.
125. See Brief for the United States as Arnicus Curiae at 12, Breard v. Green, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998) (No.
97-1390). The Department of Justice further argued that the Vienna Convention did not provide a basis for
vacating Breard's conviction and that the ICJ order was not binding on the United States. Id.
126. See Bradley, supra note 108, at 537-38 (stating safety of American citizens as a reason to stay the
execution pending the outcome of the ICI case).
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Both the United States Supreme Court and the Governor of Virginia refused to
stay the execution.127 Virginia authorities executed Angel Francisco Breard at 10:39
p.m. on April 14, 19 98 .'28
2. Karl and Walter LaGrand
Karl and Walter LaGrand were sentenced to death for fatally stabbing a bank
manager during an attempted robbery.29 Following their arrest in 1982, the Arizona
authorities failed to inform the LaGrands, who were German nationals, of their right
to contact the German Embassy. t30 A decade would pass until Germany learned of
the LaGrand situation. By 1992, the Arizona Supreme Court had once affirmed their
conviction 3 1 and later refused to review their denied post-conviction relief
petitions. 132 In 1995, the LaGrands filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which
the district court denied.133 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
denialM and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 131
Following the execution of Karl LaGrand on February 24, 1999, Germany, in
an attempt to halt the execution of Walter LaGrand, requested provisional measures
from the ICJ.136 The IC issued its ruling which ordered the United States to take
127. Id. But see Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. at 1356-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented
from the denial of certiorari because he felt that it was a "decision to act hastily rather than with the deliberation
ihat is appropriate in a case of this character." Id at 1357. Cf. Bread v. Greene, 523 U.S. at 1357 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
128. See Bradley, supra note 108, at 538.
129. See State v. LaGrand (Karl), 152 Ariz. 483,484,733 P.2d 1066,1067 (1987); see also State v. LaGrand
(Walter), 153 Ariz. 21,734 P.2d 563 (1987).
130. See William J. Aceves, INTERNATIONAL DECISION: Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Federal Republic of Germany v. United States), 93 AJ.I.L. 924 [hereinafter Aceves,
LaGrand] (discussing that during the LaGrands' arrest and subsequent conviction, they were never informed of
their right to consular assistance).
131. State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483, cert. denied 484 U.S. 872 (1987).
132. Lagrand v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991).
133. Lagrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 469 (1995); Lagrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 451 (1995).
134. Lagrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998).
135. Lagrand v. Stewart, 525 U.S. 971 (1998).
136. See Aceves, LaGrand, supra note 130 (noting further that prior to Karl's execution, the German
government had attempted to obtain relief through customary diplomatic channels); see also case Concerning the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Germany v. U.S.) (Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany) (March 2, 1999), available at <http.//www.icj-cij.org>.
Germany based the ICJs jurisdiction on the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes, 21 UST 325,596 UNTS 487, which is a supplemental treaty to the Vienna Convention and which both
the United States and Germany are signatories. IU. Germany requested the ICJ to adjudge and declare that the
Untied States violated its legal obligations under the Vienna Convention. Germany further requested reparation,
in the form of compensation and satisfaction, for the execution of Karl LaGrand. It also requested a restoration
of the status quo ante in the case of Walter LaGrand; that is, to establish the situation that existed before his
sentence and conviction. Aceves, LaGrand, supra note 130, at 924-25.
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all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand was not executed so that
the ICJ would have the opportunity to complete their proceedings.
1 37
Germany, invoking the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court, filed motions in the United States Supreme Court asking: (1) for leave to file
a bill of complaint and (2) for preliminary injunctions against the United States and
the governor of Arizona to enforce the order of the ICJ.138 In a 7-2 decision, the
Supreme Court denied the leave to file a bill of complaint and for preliminary
injunctions. 139 Walter LaGrand was executed on March 2, 1999.'
40
3. Joseph Stanley Faulder
A Texas state court convicted Joseph Stanley Faulder, a Canadian citizen of
robbery-murder and sentenced him to death.1 4' Texas authorities did not inform
Faulder of his right to contact the Canadian consul. 42 Faulder made no contacts in
Canada in preparation for trial and presented no mitigating evidence at the penalty
phase of his trial. 143
It was nearly a decade after this second trial that an attorney from the Texas
Resource Center, who was appointed to file Faulder's first habeas corpus petition,
137. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Germany v. U.S.), supra note 136.
138. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999).
139. l (stating that the Supreme Court refused to exercise their original jurisdiction in this case because
fo the "tardiness of the pleas and the jurisdictional barriers they implicate"). But see (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court should grant the preliminary stay because Germany's tardiness in filing was based on the
fact that Arizona admitted only eight days prior that it knew of the LaGrands German nationality when they were
arrested). The dissenting justices felt that the "stay would give use time to considet after briefing from all
interested parties, the jurisdictional and international legal issues involved, including further views of the Solicitor
General, after time for study and appropriate consultation." Id,
140. See Aceves, LaGrand, supra note 130, at 928. Germany's case is still pending in the ICJ. Id. The
German government submitted its Memorial to the Court on September 16, 1999, and the United States is
scheduled to submits its Counter-Memorial on March 27, 2000. Id.
141. See Faulder v. State, 745 S.W.2d 327,329-30 (1987) (en bane). This was Faulder's second conviction
for the crime. The events that lead up to this conviction merit comment. Faulder originally confessed after four
days of interrogation. Amnesty International, United States ofAmerica: Adding Insult to Injury: the case ofJoseph
Stanley Faulder [hereinafter Adding Insult to Injury] (November 1998), available in Al Index: AMR 51/86/98
and <http:lwww.amnesty.itlailib/aipub/19981AMR125108698.htm> He signed a written statement confessing to
the murder. Il He further admitted he had an accomplice named Linda McCann. Id. In 1979, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals overturned Faulder's conviction, finding that the confession was illegally obtained. Ia. The state
found without the confession, there was insufficient evidence to re-prosecute Faulder. Id. Jack Phillips, the brother
of the victim, hired private prosecutors upon learning that the state was considering offering Faulder life
imprisonment instead of the death penalty. Id. Even though Linda McCann was eligible for the death penalty
under Texas law, the private prosecutors offered her immunity and $15,000 in exchange for her testimony. Id. Her
husband was given $2000 to corroborate her testimony, as required by Texas law since McCann was an
accomplice. IfL In Faulder's second trial, his court-appointed attorney did not call any witnesses and failed to
investigate Faulder's background. During sentencing, Faulder's attorney did not attempt to rebut the testimony
of the psychiatrist who claimed that Faulder was an untreatable sociopath who would certainly kill again. Id. In
July 1981, Faulder was convicted for the second time and sentenced to death. Id.
142. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 88, Faulder v. Collins (No. C-92-CV755) (E.D.Tex. 1986).
143. See Faulder, 745 S.W.2d at 329-330; see generally Adding Insult to Injury, supra note 141.
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learned of Faulder's citizenship and contacted the Canadian Consulate. Prior to this
contact, the Canadian authorities never received any notice of Faulder's arrest and
trial, nor had his family, who had not known where he was for a number of years.
Once contacted, his family provided the attorney with medical records from
Faulder's youth that evidenced that he had organic brain damage. This information,
along with the support and resources of his family and native government, would
have proved invaluable to Faulder at both of his trials. However, Faulder was
deprived of these resources because of the failure of Texas officials to inform
Faulder of his right to contact his consulate." 4
On September 30, 1987, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed
Faulder's conviction and death sentence following the submission of a brief
asserting twenty-six grounds of error.145 In April of 1996, after numerous
complications and appeals,' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed
Faulder's habeas corpus petition on all grounds. 147 On June 16, 1999, the Fifth
Circuit denied Faulder's motion for a stay of execution and affirmed the district
144. See Canadian Amicus, supra note 8, at 14-17 (outlining the duties that Canadian consular officials
possess in protecting the rights of their citizens). Those duties include, contacting family members who often
prove priceless in constructing a complete defense, assisting the prisoner's lawyer, ensuring that Canadian citizens
receive equitable treatment from foreign tribunals, assuring that the prisoner has been fully informed of his rights,
and providing a list of attorneys recommended by Canadian authorities to the prisoner. Id.; see also Adding Insult
to Injury, supra notel41. The report states that
Canada's position was recently supported by the findings of a United Nations report. In a 1998 survey
of death penalty procedures in the USA, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, arbitrary and
summary executions made specific reference to the Faulder case and the appellate courts' finding of
"harmless error." The report determined that 'not informing the defendant ofthe right to contact his/her
consulate for assistance may curtail the right to an adequate defence,' as provided for by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Id., citing Report to the UN Commission on Human Rights (document EICN.4119981681Add.3), Findings of the
Special Rapporteur, 117-121. Id
145. Faulder v. State, 745 S.W.2d 327 (1987) (en bane).
146. See Adding Insult to Injury, supra note 141. Faulder first asserted his Vienna Convention rights at an
evidentiary hearing in 1992. Id In 1993, Faulder put forth evidence suggesting that McCann's husband was
involved in the planning of the crime. Id. This would warrant him incompetent as a witness to corroborate his
wife's testimony. Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted a stay of execution
and held an evidentiary hearing regarding the use of special prosecutors and the questionable testimony of
McCann. Id. The Court denied Faulder's petition, but granted a certificate of probability cause of appeal. Id.
147. Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996). The court concluded that the admitted breach of the
Vienna Convention was a harmless error.
Faulder or Faulder's attorney had access to all of the information that could have been obtained by the
Canadian government. While we in no way approve of Texas' failure to advise Faulder, the evidence
that would have been obtained by the Canadian authorities is merely the same as or cumulative of
evidence defense counsel had or could have obtained.
Id. at 520. But see Canadian Amicus, supra note 8 at 34, n.16 (stating that
[t]he failure to notify Mr. Faulder of his rights prevented Canadian consular officers from taking
appropriate action to ensure that he suffered no disadvantage in preparing and presenting his defense
due to his status as a foreigner, ignorant of the Texas system ofjustice, deprived of access to mitigating
evidence, and lacking experienced counsel).
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court's dismissal of Faulder's motions for a stay of execution and temporary
restraining order.' Faulder was executed on June 17, 1999.
Following the deaths of Breard, the LaGrands, and Faulder, the United States
Department of State attempted to clarify some of the confusion surrounding the
Vienna Convention and a foreign national's right to consular assistance.
IV. STATE DEPARTMENT HANDBOOK
In its attempt to inform local authorities of the importance of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, the State Department issued a handbook in
January 1998 which sets out the procedures to follow when detaining a foreign
national. 49 The Department distributed this handbook to all law enforcement
agencies. 0 The handbook begins by summarizing the requirements when detaining
a foreign national as:
1. When foreign nationals are arrested or detained, they must be advised
of the right to have their consular officials notified.
2. In some cases, the nearest consular officials must be notified of the
arrest or detention of a foreign national, regardless of the national's
wishes.
3. Consular officials are entitled to access to their nationals in detention,
and are entitled to provide consular assistance.
4. When a government official becomes aware of the death of a foreign
national, consular officials must be notified.
5. When a guardianship or trusteeship is being considered with respect to
a foreign national who is a minor or incompetent, consular officials
must be notified.
148. Faulder v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 741,742 (5th Cir. 1999). The court listed the following reasons: (1) court
has no appellate jurisdiction over the denial of temporary restraining orders and (2) federal courts lack jurisdiction
to stay executions. Id.
149. See Consular Notification and Access, supra note 29; see also Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 92 AJ.I.L. 243, 247 (1998) (discussing the release
of the State Department handbook).
150. Consular Notification and Access, supra note 29.
This booklet is designed to help ensure that foreign governments can extend appropriate consular
services to their nationals in the United States and that the United States complies with its legal
obligations to such governments. The instructions and guidance herein should be followed by all
federal, state, and local government officials, whether law enforcement, judicial, or other, insofar as
they pertain to foreign nationals subject to such officials' authority or to matters within such officials'
competence.
Id. at i.
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6. When a foreign ship or aircraft wrecks or crashes, consular officials
must be notified.
15
Part One of the handbook also has a suggested statement for officials to use when
informing the foreign detainee of their right to consular notification.' 52
Part Two of the handbook sets forth detailed instructions for authorities
detaining foreign nationals. 153 This section explains the right to consular notification
is mandatory.'5 Whether or not the foreign national wishes to exercise that right is
immaterial.' 55 Furthermore, the handbook informs the reader that it is the
responsibility of the detaining officer to inform a consular official if a detained
national requests consular notification. 151
Part Three of the handbook answers some of the more common questions that
arise in dealing with consular notification. 157 These range from defining a consular
officer, 58 to explaining why state and local government officials are required to
151. Id. at 13-15 (emphasis in original). Part One also has a list of four steps to follow when a foreign
national is arrested or detained. Id. at 4. It also contains a list of those countries that have a mandatory notification
provision in its bilateral agreement with the United States. Id. at 5.
152. Id. at 7. The suggested statement for nonmandatory consular notification is:
As a non-U.S. citizen who is being arrested or detained, you are entitled to have us notify your
country's consular representatives here in the United States. A consular official from your country may
be able to help you obtain legal counsel, and may contact your family and visit you in detention,
among other things. If you want us to notify your country's consular officials, you can request this
notification now, or at any time in the future. After your consular officials are notified, they may call
or visit you. Do you want us to notify your country's consular officials?
Id.
The suggested statement for mandatory consular notification is:
Because of your nationality, we are required to notify your country's consular representatives here in
the United States that you have been arrested or detained. After your consular officials are notified,
they may call or visit you. You are not required to accept their assistance, but they may be able to help
you obtain legal counsel and may contact your family and visit you in detention, among other things.
We will be notifying your country's consular officials as soon as possible.
153. Id. at 14-15.
154. Id at 14. "Whenever a foreign national is arrested or detained in the United States, there are legal
requirements to ensure that the foreign national's government can offer him/her appropriate consular assistance,
In all cases, the foreign national must be told of the right of consular notification and access." Id. (emphasis in
original).
155. Id. at 14 (clarifying that if the foreign national is from a country that has a bilateral agreement with the
United States that contains provisions for mandatory notification to be made to the consulate, then the consul is
to be immediately notified even if the foreign national does not request it). However, "under no circumstances
should any information indicating that aforeign national may have applied for asylum in the United States or
elsewhere be disclosed to that person's government." Id. (emphasis in original).
156. Id. at 14-15.
157. Id, at 17-23.
158. Id. at 17 (defining a consular officer as
a citizen of a foreign country employed by a foreign government and authorized to provide assistance
on behalf of that government to that government's citizens in a foreign country. Consular officers are
generally assigned to the consular section of a foreign government's embassy in Washington, D.C.,
or to consular offices maintained by the foreign government in locations in the United States outside
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abide by the Vienna Convention provisions.' 59 This section also reminds authorities
that by giving foreign nationals their right to consular notification, they ensure that
foreign governments will afford Americans traveling abroad the same right.' 60 Part
Four of the handbook provides translations of the suggested statements to detained
foreign nationals provided in Part One of the handbook.'
Part Five of the handbook summarizes the legal authority of the consular
notification requirements. 162 The handbook lists the Vienna Convention, bilateral
agreements, and customary international law as the basis for consular
notification. 63 Part Five includes the language of these documents that create legal
obligations for the United States.6
Even with the distribution of this handbook, officers are still falling to inform
foreign nationals of their right to consular assistance.'6 The Department of State
issued the handbook with the hope that local authorities would begin upholding
America's obligations under the Vienna Convention. However, a study of cases
following publication of the handbook demonstrated that those hopes have yet to
be fully realized.
V. POST-HANDBOOK CASES
The cases of Vienna Convention violations following the issuance of the State
Department Handbook embody the handbook's guidelines, as well as the principles
and tests laid down in earlier cases, in analyzing Article 36.'6 However, foreign
of Washington, DC).
159. Id. at 19 (explaining that state and local governments must comply because the obligations are part of
a treaty and as such they are part of the law of the land under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
160. Id. at 21 (reminding officers that they
should treat the foreign national as you would want an American citizen to be treated in a similar
situation in a foreign country. This means prompt, courteous notification to the foreign national of the
possibility of consular assistance, and prompt, courteous notification to the foreign national's nearest
consular officials so that they can perform whatever consular services they deem appropriate).
161. IdM at 25-39. Translations are provided in the following languages: Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, French,
German, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Vietnamese.
162. M at 41-58.
163. let at 42 (stating that the Vienna Convention "now establishes the baseline for most obligations with
respect to the treatment of foreign nationals"). The stated purpose of the bilateral agreements is that there are some
special circumstances that arise in the area of consular relations that are not dealt with fully by the Vienna
Convention and so the bilateral agreements are used to supplement the Vienna Convention. Id. at 43. The
handbook also reiterates the principle that because consular notification is based in customary international law,
it is a "universally accepted, basic obligation that should be extended even to foreign nationals who do not benefit
from the VCCR or from any other applicable bilateral agreement." Id. at 44.
164. Id. at 45-49. The handbook includes Articles 5,36, and 37 of the Vienna Convention and excerpts from
bilateral agreements.
165. See infra Part V.
166. This comment deals in large part only with cases that were entirely instigated after the publication of
the State Department Handbook, i.e., those cases that began with an arrest after January of 1998. Those cases dealt
with are: United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Il. 1999); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37
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defendants are still not being afforded their right to consular assistance. 67 The
problem of procedural default that prevented Breard, Faulder and the LaGrands
from enforcing their rights under the Vienna Convention has been replaced with
new problems for foreign defendants,a These hurdles lie in the three part test that
courts apply in these situations: the government will claim that (1) the Vienna
Convention does not provide for a private right of action and therefore, defendants
do not have standing to enforce the Vienna Convention;'6 (2) the defendants were
not actually prejudiced by the violation;170 or (3) even if they were prejudiced, a
proper remedy has yet to be found.17 1 Courts disagree as to the application of these
principles.
A. Private Right and Standing
A foreign defendant must first prove that he has standing to enforce the Vienna
Convention by demonstrating that the Treaty provides for a private right of
action. 172 Historically, treaties could only be enforced by states, and if a violation
against an individual occurred, the nation-state would bring the suit on the injured
individual's behalf.' 73 However, some treaties now include an individual right in
their language.174 The courts dealing with the Vienna Convention disagree as to
whether or not the Vienna Convention conferred a private right. This comment will
illustrate the division between the courts in interpreting this issue.
F. Supp. 2d 1122 (1999); United States v. Miranda, 65 F. Supp, 2d 1002 (D.Minn. 1999); State v. Reyes
[hereinafter Reyes 1], 740 A.2d 7 (Del. 1999); State v. Reyes [hereinafter Reyes II], 1999WL 743598 (Del. Super.
1999); United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp.
2d 672 (1999); United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (1999); and United States v. Torrcs-Del
Muro, 58 F. Supp. 931 (1999),
167. But see Reyes 1, 740 A.2d at 14-15 (finding that a defendant's Vienna Convention rights were violated
and that the violation lead to a dismissal of the case).
168. See supra Part I1.
169. See infra Part V.A.
170. See infra Part V.B.
171. See infra Part V.C.
172. See Molora Vadnais, A Diplomatic Morass: An Argument Against Judicial Involvement in Article 36
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 47 UCLA L. REV. 307, 315-16 (1999). The author explains that
"invocability refers to the 'question whether even though a rule of an international agreement is directly applied,
a particular party can rely on this rule as 'law' in his particular case.' Invocability therefore is similar to standing."
Id., citing John H. Jackson, United States, in The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law 141, 157 (Francis G. Jacobs
& Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
173. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty.Based Rights and Remedies ofIndividuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1082 (1992) (providing a discussion of the history of international individual rights).
174. See United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791,799 (1992) (discussing that while typically individuals
do not have standing to invoke treaty-based rights, when a treaty "expressly or impliedly provides a private right
of action, it is self-executing and can be invoked by an individual"); see also Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,
598-99 (1884).
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In Chaparro-Alcantara, the court held that the Vienna Convention confers a
private right "to object to a violation of that provision."' 75 In that case, the
defendants, Mexican citizens, were arrested for transporting illegal aliens on
October 21, 1998.176 The court reached this conclusion because it felt the language
of the Vienna Convention provided a private right of action,' 77 and that the courts
who had previously dealt with the Vienna Convention had found a private right.
78
In State v. Reyes, the Delaware Superior Court found that the Vienna
Convention confers a private right and so the defendant, a Guatemalan citizen
charged with murder, had standing to enforce the Vienna Convention. 179 The court
felt that the intent of the drafters of the Vienna Convention, as well as the language
of Article 36, demonstrates that individuals have a private right to enforce the
Vienna Convention.180 The Delaware court also noted that "most courts facing the
question of whether detained aliens have standing to raise claims under the
Convention have conceded that they do."'8 '
In United States v. Superville, defendant, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, was
arrested and later indicted for falsely representing that he possessed a Social
Security number not assigned to him.182 In finding that the Vienna Convention
confers a private right of action, the court stated that, "[t]he text of the Vienna
Convention, the recorded intentions of its drafters, and the prevailing view among
federal agencies and courts lead this Court to conclude that, as a detained alien,
Superville has standing to seek relief for INS' alleged violation of the Vienna
Convention .... ,"13 "Article 36 [of the Vienna Convention] was adopted with the
necessary safeguards to protect individual freedoms, including a requirement that
175. See United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (C.D.1II. 1999) (finding that the
majority of cases have held that the Vienna Convention confers standing to individuals who have suffered a
violation of the treaty).
176. Id. at 1123.
177. Id at 1125 (discussing that "the actual text of Article 36, which is more persuasive as to the parties
intent, suggests that persons have individual notification 'rights' under the sub-paragraph").
178. Id. (finding that even the U.S. Supreme Court in Breard v. Greene stated that the Vienna Convention
arguably confers a private right of action).
179. See Reyes 1, 70 A.2d at 14.
180. See Reyes 11, 1999 WL 743598 (stating that the finding of an individual right in Reyes I was based the
fact that the Vienna Convention, as a self-executing treaty, does confer private rights on individuals). The court
went on to state that the majority of courts have agreed with this assertion. Id.
181. Reyes 1, 70 A.2d at 9-10.
182. United States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674 (1999).
183. Id. at 678; see also Consular Notification and Access, supra note 145, at 49 (indicating that as a citizen
of Trinidad and Tobago, Superville was entitled to the following provision: "A consular officer shall be informed
immediately by the appropriate authorities of the territory when any national of the sending state is confined in
prison awaiting trial or is otherwise detained in custody within his district." However, in this case, it appears that
the INS was not at fault because agents did provide Superville with an opportunity to speak with his consulate and
he did not wish to avail himself of that right. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 678-79; see also United States v.
Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (explaining that it was clear from statements of the
framers fo the Vienna Convention that they intended Article 36 to confer an individual right to consular
assistance).
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the foreign national be told of his right to request such notification and a prohibition
on notification unless the foreign national requests it."'
84
However, while only a few courts have held that the Vienna Convention does
not confer a private right, there are those who assume standing, but refuse to
address the issue directly. For example, in United States v. Tapia-Mendoza,' the
court assumes without deciding that the defendant has standing to enforce the
treaty.186 The court felt is it was unnecessary to decide the issue because they
followed court opinions that found standing irrelevant because of problems with the
other parts of the test, prejudice and remedy.' 87
In United States v. Rodrigues, a Guyanan citizen, was arrested on three counts
of federal narcotics charges. 88 In discussing standing, the court recognized that the
Vienna Convention most likely confers an individual right to consular assistance.' 89
The court felt, however, that the Vienna Convention is ambiguous as to whether or
not there is a private right to enforce the Treaty.' However, despite a finding that
the majority of courts have found that the Convention does create a private right of
action, the Rodrigues court only assumed standing. 9'
In United States v. Miranda, a Magistrate Judge believed that Miranda, a
Mexican national charged with drug possession, had standing to enforce the Vienna
Convention because "[t]he right conferred by an international treaty upon detained
foreign nationals is not one that should be treated lightly or ignored by the United
States' courts or criminal justice system."' 92 However, upon review, the District
Court chose not to decide the standing issue by merely assuming standing. 193 The
184. See Bin Lin Amicus, supra note 35, at 19 (confirming that the legislative history of the Vienna
Convention supports the finding that the Vienna Convention confers an individual right to foreign nationals). The
authors make note that there were numerous amendments offered during the formation of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention that would have eliminated this private right and that none of these were accepted by the delegates.
Id. at 16-19.
185. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1251.
186. See id. at 1253 (claiming that no court had found that the Convention provided an individual right and
that they felt that it was unlikely that the Convention did confer a private right).
187. See id. at 1253-54 (supporting the reasoning set forth by the Fourth Circuit that held that the prejudice
standard was necessary because the violation of a treaty did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation); see
also infra Part V.B.I.c. (discussing the prejudice requirement in the Tapia-Mendoza case).
188. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 180-81. On June 5, 1998, customs agents discovered two boxes full of
cocaine that had been shipped from Guyana. Il The agents removed the cocaine and placed a "sham load" in the
-boxes with a tracking device. l The boxes were then released from customs and sent to a storage facility in
Brooklyn, New York, where they were removed on June 9, 1998 by Rodrigues. Id.
189. See id. at 182 (explaining that it is clear that the framers of the Vienna Convention intended Article
36 to confer an individual right to consular assistance, but that the framers did not discuss the appropriate remedy
for a breach of this individual right).
190. See id. (discussing that the preamble to the Vienna Convention seems to indicate that the Vienna
Convention was enacted for the protection of consular officials, and not foreign nationals). The court did find that
the drafters of Article 36 intended to create a private right to be notified of the Convention's protections. Id.
191. Id. at 103.
192. United States v. Miranda, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1011 (D. Minn. 1999).
193. Id. at 1006.
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Court felt it was proper not to decide standing because the question of whether or
not the Vienna Convention confers a private right is an area that is "open to
debate."' 94
Drug enforcement agents arrested Anselmo Carrillo, a Medcan national, for
"knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute 48 kilograms of
cocaine."" The Illinois court put forth a lengthy discussion on the issue of
standing. The Court first noted that the Seventh Circuit has yet to rule on the matter
and that other circuit decisions do not bind this Court's decision.196 Then, the Court
discussed notes the division in the courts that have dealt with the issue. In the end,
the Court found that it is unnecessary to determine the issue of standing to
determine the outcome of this case and so it left the issue unresolved.
97
It is clear from the language of the Vienna Convention that the drafters' intent
of Article 36 and the interpretation of the United States courts that the Vienna
Convention confers a private right upon the individual. The language of Article
36(b) of the Vienna Convention provides: "if he so requests, the competent
authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of
the sending State... [that] a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison
or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner."' 98 The Vienna
Convention demands that the detaining officials inform the individual of his right.
When the individual is not given consular notification, the individual suffers. The
language of the Vienna Convention confers a private right to sue when a foreign
defendant is not given notification of his right to contact his consulate.' 99 To argue
194. Id. at 1005.
195. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 855-56. The details leading to the arrest were that the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) had received information that a red Mercury automobile had the sort of trap compartment in it that
drug traffickers use to transport narcotics. I On the date of the arrest, DEA agents located the Mercury in
Addison Illinois at the Belmont Address. Id. While the Mercury was parked in the driveway, a red Toyota truck
drove up with three Hispanic males in it. lat One got out and drove the Mercury away with the Toyota following.
Id. The DEA agents followed the two automobiles to a second location, the Clarendon address, and parked it
inside a garage. Id. Two hours later, the two automobiles and the three men left again. lIt The DEA agents were
unable to keep up with them and lost them for about 20 minutes at which time the found the Toyota in a cinema
parking lot with all three men in it. Id. The Mercury was also parked in the lot. Id. The Toyota drove around for
about 10 minutes and then returned to the parking lot. Id. At this time, the DEA agents stopped the Toyota and
arrested the men. IL The agents found the keys for the Mercury and a garage door opener for the Clarendon
address on Carrillo's person. Id. Carrillo signed a waiver of rights and consent to search the Mercury. Ld. The DEA
agents found the trap compartment which contained 48 one kilogram bricks of cocaine. Id.
196. Id. at 858.
197. IAL at 858-59 (citing cases from various courts, including the Supreme Court, who have generally held
that they assume without deciding that the foreign defendant has standing to enforce the Treaty). Although the
majority of the cases cited were of this type, the Court was able to find cases that held that the defendants did have
standing to enforce it and one that held they did not. Id.
198. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 36.
199. See United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999). The court responded
to the argument that even if the Treaty confers private rights, that defendants still do not have standing. "It has
long been recognized that where a treaty's provisions establish individual rights, these rights must be enforced
by the courts of the United States at the behest of the individual." The Court is referring to United States v. Rasher,
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that an individual does not have standing to enforce Article 36 is to ignore the
language of the Treaty.
Arguing that an individual does not have standing also ignores the intent of the
Vienna Convention's drafters. As evidenced by the discussions in Chaparro-
Alcantara, Reyes, Superville, Rodrigues, and Carrillo, the majority of courts
recognize that the drafters of the Vienna Convention intended to bestow a private
right upon the individual to sue.
B. Actual Prejudice
After establishing standing to sue under the Vienna Convention, a foreign
defendant must next demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice from the denial
of his Vienna Convention rights.200 The Ninth Circuit in Calderon-Medina,
determined that prejudice exists when the violation harms "the aliens interests in
such a way as to affect potentially the outcome of their deportation proceedings."2°t
The prejudice requirement does not originate in the text of the Vienna Convention,
but rather from American judicial construction. 202 The courts require a defendant
to demonstrate prejudice because a violation of the Vienna Convention does not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation of rights.0
The majority of defendants have been unable to satisfy the criteria the courts
use for determining if the defendant were prejudiced by the violation.204 This
comment will discuss three of the standards courts use in determining whether or
not a foreign defendant suffered prejudice.
119 U.S. 407,418-19 (1886), citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); see also United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 504 U.S. 655,659-60 (1992) (recognizing the continuing authority of Rasher). Because Article 36(I)(b)
establishes individual rights, these rights must be enforced by our courts. Id.; Ben Lin Amicus, supra note 35, at
15-19.
200. See Kaddish, supra note 8, at 603 (explaining that the prejudice standard was first articulated in
Calderon-Medina and Waldron, although the two courts adopted different standards of prejudice). Kaddish goes
on to argue that under the Miranda doctrine, individuals have a right to be informed of certain fundamental rights.
I& He explains that consular notification is a fundamental right and so under the Miranda principle, individuals
have a right to be notified of it. ld. at 603-04. Kaddish further argues that "Article 36 embodies a presumption
of prejudice when a foreign national is arrested." Al at 604.
201. See Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 532.
202. See Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (stating that the Vienna Convention does not contain a prejudice
requirement, but that "the few federal courts that have considered this subject have required claimants to show
prejudice from violations of the treaty").
203. See Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (stating that "foreign nationals asserting Convention violations
must show prejudice, since their right to consular notification is derived from a treaty that does not implicate
fundamental rights and, therefore, must be treated the same as a violation of any other non-constitutional right").
see also United States v. Miranda, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1006 (D.Minn. 1999) (finding that since the Supremacy
Clause provides that a treaty is not at the same level of law as the Constitution, a "criminal defendant must
establish prejudice resulting from a violation of his or her rights under the Convention").
204. See infra Parts V.B.I.a.-V.B.I.c.
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1. Unable to Prove Prejudice
There are three reasons that lead courts to determine that the foreign defendant
failed to establish prejudice. First, there are cases that determined the foreign
defendant actually received consular notification. Secondly, there are those
defendants that were unable to show prejudice because they could not establish that
their consulate would have provided information that was different from the
information the foreign national had already received. Finally, there are those courts
that feel that when authorities issue Miranda rights to the foreign national, he can
never establish prejudice for a violation of the Vienna Convention.
a. Defendant Received Vienna Convention Notification
Two of the cases discussed in this comment involve foreign defendants who
received notification of their right to contact their consulate. In United States v.
Superville, the record indicated that the INS informed Superville of his right to
contact his consulate. As there was nothing in the record to dispute this, the court
ruled that Superville could not have suffered prejudice from a denial of Vienna
Convention rights.
The defendant in United States v. Miranda was also informed of his right to
consular notification. However, notification came two days after Miranda had been
arrested and after he was interrogated. The Miranda court recognized that "a period
of two days constitutes a 'delay' within the meaning of the Convention when...
the record is devoid of evidence demonstrating that earlier notification would not
have been reasonably possible."20 However, the court felt that Miranda could not
establish prejudice because once informed of his right to contact his consulate, he
did not choose to exercise that right.
b. Miranda Warning Was Given
The court in United States v. Rodrigues found that statements by Rodrigues that
he would have invoked his right to counsel and would not have made any
statements are an inadequate demonstration of prejudice.206 The court went on,
205. Miranda, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1005. The Court further expressed the view that when arresting officers
had a sufficient amount of time to issue the proper Miranda warnings, there was also time to issue the consular
notification. Id. But see Consular Notification and Access, supra note 29, at 20 (requiring that "[o]nce foreign
nationality is known, advising the national of the right to consular notification should follow promptly"). In the
case of an arrest followed by a detention, the Department of State would ordinarily expect the foreign national
to have been advised of the possibility of consular notification by the time the foreign national is booked for
detention." Id.
206. See Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 183-84. The court doubted Rodrignes' contention that he would have
remained silence and found that "there is no requirement in the Convention that the interrogation of a foreign
national must stop when he is told of Article 36's consular notification provision." Id. at 184. They stated that the
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stating that "[p]rejudice has never been-nor could reasonably be-found in a case
where a foreign national was given, understood, and waived his or her Miranda
rights."2°
In United States v. Carrillo, the Government argued that the defendants were
absolutely given their Miranda rights.208
Thus, the Government argues, any consultation from the Mexican consulate
would have been merely repetitive. Further, the Government argues that the
Vienna Convention does not require that a detained foreign national be
allowed to speak to his consulate before interrogation commences.2M
The defendants did not challenge these positions, but rather requested a hearing to
demonstrate prejudice.10 The court denied the request and, in doing so, appears to
accept the position of the Government. 1
c. Information Provided by Consul
The Tapia-Mendoza court required the foreign defendant to prove that he would
have acquired different information from the consul. That court adopted a test set
forth by the Ninth Circuit for establishing prejudice.212
"without delay" requirement had been interpreted by the State Department to mean compliance within 24 to 72
hours of the request. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that even if Rodrigues was informed of and then requested
consular assistance, agents still could have questioned him and obtained the rightful waiver of his Miranda rights.
Id. But see Consular Notification and Access, supra note 29, at 20 (proscribing the time limit as "within 24 hours,
and certainly within 72 hours." (emphasis added)).
207. Id. But see Consular Notification and Access, supra note 29, at 19-20. In response to the question of
whether a foreign national must be given consular notification, even if the Miranda warning was given, the
handbook directs that:
Consular notification should not be confused with the Miranda warning, which is given regardless of
nationality to protect the individual's constitutional rights against self-incrinilnation and to the
assistance of legal counsel. Consular notification is given as a result of international legal
requirements, so that a foreign government can provide its nationals with whatever consular assistance
is deemed appropriate. You should follow consular notification procedures with respect to detained
foreign nationals in addition to providing Miranda or other warnings required.
Id.; see also Canadian Amicus, supra note 8, at 25-26 (concluding that "article 36 imposes an additional
obligation of consular access for foreign prisoners .... Thus failure to comply with article 36 cannot be excused
as harmless on the ground that the receiving State provided other rights to the foreign defendant." (emphasis in
original)).
208. United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860 (N.D.Ili. 1999).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 860 (stating that the [d]efendants' failure to respond arguably forfeits their opportunity to show
prejudice).
211. Id.
212. See Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F Supp. 2d at 1254. The test is set forth in the Ninth Circuit opinion in United
States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434,440 (1989) overruled on other grounds by U.S. v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592
(1992).
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To establish prejudice, the defendant must produce evidence that 1) He did
not know of his right [to consult the Mexican Consulate]; 2) he would have
availed himself of the right had he known of it; and 3) there was a
likelihood that contact [with the consul] would have resulted in assistance
to him.
213
The Tapia-Mendoza court determined that the defendant met the requirements of
this test. They reasoned that the affidavit from the Consul of Mexico and the
defendant's own statement (that he would have utilized his right to consular
assistance) were not enough to establish prejudice.21 4 "Defendant failed to produce
evidence that such contact [with the Mexican Consul] would have resulting in
assistance to him beyond his existing knowledge of Miranda warnings and
rights. 21 5
The defendants in Chaparro-Alcantara offered affidavits from themselves and
the Mexican consul in St. Louis as proof of prejudice.216 The court, however, felt
that the foreign defendants would not have been able to procure information from
the Mexican Consulate that was in anyway different from the information the INS
provided them.217 The court further felt that even if the defendants had exercised
their right to consular assistance, it is not certain that they would have stopped
answering questions until the consul arrived. 2 8 For these reasons, the court
determined that the foreign defendants were unable to establish prejudice.
Of the cases examined in this comment, only State v. Reyes has concluded that
the foreign defendant suffered prejudice.21 9 The court finds that the failure of the
officers to inform the foreign national of his right to consular assistance prejudiced
213. See id. (applying the Villa-Fabela test).
214. Id. at 1254-55. The court reasoned that the defendant could not have been prejudiced because he had
been deported before and so he was familiar with immigration laws and procedures. Id. The defendant stated at
a hearing that "he would have liked to contact the Mexican Consul because he 'hoped [the Consul] could have
made [him] more aware of the [sic] certain rights that [he] may have had."' I&a The Affidavit from the Consul of
Mexico stated that "a representative of the Consulate would visit the citizen and provide advice concerning each
of her Miranda rights, and that such a defendant would be advised that such rights should be asserted." Id.
215. Id. at 1255.
216. See UnitedStatesv. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122,1125-27 (1999) (indicating that thecourt
felt an affidavit from the Mexican Consul in St. Louis stating that he would have fully informed the defendants
of their rights under Miranda and made certain that they understood them and the importance of invoking them
and affidavits that the defendants filed stating that they would have sought out the assistance of the Mexican
consulate if they had known that they were entitled to it and furthermore, that they would have followed whatever
advice the consulate provided).
217. Id. at 1126-27.
218. Id. at 1126 (holding that "in order for Chaparro-Alcantara and Romero-Bautistato establish prejudice,
they must show that had they been advised of their right to speak with the Consulate, they would have not waived
their Fifth Amendment rights until they spoke to their Consulate").
219. State v. Reyes I, 740 A.2d 7, 13-15 (Del. 1999).
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the national.220 The court further held that a foreign defendant is not required to
prove that he would have contacted his consulate or that the consulate would have
changed his decision to speak to the police 2 t" The Court intimates that "[i]t suffices
to state that the issue in this case is not whether Defendant would have asserted his
Article 36 consular notification rights, but whether or not, following his arrest,
Defendant was informed of his consular notification rights." 222 The Court goes on
to clarify that it "is not holding that a violation of the Vienna Convention is
prejudice per se. It is merely stating that in this case, the Court has made a specific
finding of prejudice." 2m
With the exception of Reyes, these cases have held that a foreign defendant is
only prejudiced when he can prove that his consul would have offered information
different from what the law enforcement officers provided or when the foreign
national was not given his Miranda rights. These opinions overlook that a foreign
defendant is prejudiced simply by being foreign. 224 Assistance from his consul puts
a foreign defendant on a more equal footing with non-foreign defendants.
A foreign defendant is prejudiced because he is unfamiliar with the American
legal system. A foreign defendant is prejudiced when English is not his first
language. A foreign defendant is prejudiced because he may be unfamiliar with the
"'nation's customs, police policies, or criminal proceedings,' and may be unable to
defend himself due to ignorance, lack of resources, and discrimination based on his
national origin. '' 2
220. Id. at 13 (discussing that the state attempted to persuade the Court that in order to prove prejudice, the
Court should find that the Defendant
'would have to argue that he would have contacted the Guatemalan consul had he known of his right
to do so' and that Defendant has 'the burden of showing how contacting the Guatemalan Consulate
would have changed his position by presenting evidence that the consul's [sic] would have changed
his decision to speak to the police.').
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 14, citing Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170, 175 (1990) (emphasizing that "[i]t is well-established
in Delaware and in our national that a suspect may be interrogated only if he makes a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of his rights"); see also Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
224. See generally Sugarman v. Dougall. 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
These cases indicate that American courts have a history of recognizing the foreigners are discriminated against
because of their ancestry. Because of this, the Supreme Court has found that aliens are a suspect class under the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court has routinely invalidated statutes
discriminating against foreign nationals.
225. See Kaddish, supra note 8, at 605, quoting Brief Amicus Curiae of the United Mexican States, Ohio
v. Loza (Ohio CL App., 12th Dist., Butler County 1997) (no. CA96-10-0214) at 9; see also Daina C. Chiu, The
Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1053, 1113 (1994)
(stating one of the reasons to recognize cultural differences is that "[c]ultural factors can be relevant to the
defendant's motivations, premeditation or deliberation, provocation or heat of passion, and to the defendant's
understanding and perception of the circumstances leading up to and immediately following the charged crime").
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 13
Consular assistance considerably alleviates this prejudice. Foreign consular
officials state that part of their role is to come to the aid of their citizens when
detained by local authorities. 6
C. Proper Remedy
The Vienna Convention does not provide a remedy for a violation of Article
36.227 However, foreign defendants generally seek to invoke the exclusionary rule
to remedy the Vienna Convention violation. Some of the courts examined in this
comment discussed other remedies, such as diplomatic channels and monetary
relief.
1. Exclusionary Rule
Foreign defendants request suppression of the evidence obtained against them
in violation of their Vienna Convention rights. "In short, Defendants seek to invoke
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a treaty violation."' 8 The exclusionary rule
was designed to "safeguard against future violations of [constitutional] rights
through the rule's general deterrent effect."
229
a. Majority View
The majority of courts examined in this comment have found that the
exclusionary rule is not available as a remedy for a treaty violation. They have held
that the exclusionary rule is only available if the violation rises to the level of an
226. See LEE, supra note 20, at 127. The Mexican government has identified protection of Mexican
nationals as one fo the most important roles of Mexican consuls by including in their duties the following
provisions: "1. to assist and advise Mexicans in their dealings with local authorities; 2. to visit Mexicans in
detention, in prison, in hospitals, or in any other difficult situation ... ; and 3. to represent Mexicans who are
absent or otherwise incapable of handling their own affairs." Id.; see also Canadian Amicus, supra note 8, at 13.
The usual functions performed for a detained national by a Canadian consular official as being:
communicating with and visiting the prisoner, explaining the rudiments of his situation; explaining
that the is fully subject to the arresting country's judicial system; verifying that he prisoner receives
adequate treatment while detained; taking steps to see that the prisoner has appropriate local legal
representation; and monitoring proceedings to ensure that the accused receives a trial that accords with
generally recognized principles of justice, within a reasonable time.
Id. (citations omitted).
227. See Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 7.
228. United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854, 861-62.
229. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (finding
that the rule's purpose is to deter police officers from violating individuals's constitutional rights); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (discussing the applicability of the exclusionary rule for a violation of Fifth
Amendment rights); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (applying the exclusionary rule to police
violations of the Sixth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (recognizing the applicability of the
exclusionary rule to state violations of the Fourth Amendment).
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infringement on Constitutional or fundamental rights. Furthermore, the one court
that discussed the exclusionary rule in connection with the concepts of international
law found that it was unavailable as a remedy.
i. Exclusionary Rule is Available if the Treaty Violation Rises to the
Level of Violations of Constitutional or Fundamental Rights
In declining to apply the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of the
Vienna Convention, the court in United States v. Rodrigues stated that "[e]xclusion
as a remedy was established to deter governmental actors from impinging on
fundamental rights and 'should only be employed when those values are
implicated.' ' 0 The court felt that the exclusionary rule was an improper remedy
because a violation of the Vienna Convention does not rise to the level of a
Constitutional violation." t Furthermore, the court found that the justification of the
exclusionary rule---"to reduce governmental infringement on fundamental
constitutional rights-is not implicated when Article 36 of the Convention is
violated.' '232 The majority of other courts concurred with the analysis put forth by
the Rodrigues court and have found that the exclusionary rule is not available for
a treaty violation.23
230. United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 185, citing $69,530.00 in United States Currency, 22
F. Supp. 2d 593, 595 (W.D.Tex. 1998). But see Kaddish, supra note 8, at 604, quoting Reply Brief of Amicus
Curiae United Mexican States, Murphy v. Netherland (4th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-14) at 5: "It is Mexico's
understanding that the courts of the United States consider a right fundamental when it protects a basic human
right, such as the right to life or liberty, and when its observance or denial impacts the overall fairness of the
proceedings. The right to of a foreign national to contact his consul is such a right. Its denial is a fundamental
defect int eh proceedings against a foreign national."
231. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (quoting Murphy v. Netherland, as stating: "Just as a [government
actor] does not violate a constitutional right merely by violating a federal statute, it does not violate a
constitutional right merely by violating a treaty").
232. d The court finds the basis for this argument in $69,530.00 in United States Currency, which states:
A convention or treaty signed by the United States does not alter or add to our Constitution. Such
international agreements are important and are entitled to enforcement, as written, but they are not the
bedrock and foundation of our essential liberties and accordingly should not be cloaked with
the ... [exclusionary remedy] that protects those liberties.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The Rodrigues court further states that "Consular notification is not a fundamental right
derived from the Constitution, nor is it, in the words of Justice Cardozo, 'the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty.' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)."
233. See Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 861-62 (discussing that the court could not locate a case that held that
the exclusionary rule was a proper remedy for a violation of the Vienna Convention because the violation did not
rise to a fundamental, constitutional violation); see also Miranda, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1006 (indicating that the
exclusionary rule is an improper remedy because the right of consular notification does not rise to the level of a
constitutional right and that the majority of courts have reached this same conclusion); United States v. Torres-Del
Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d 931,934 (1999) (concluding that "the failure to notify the foreign national of his right to
speak with his consul, per se, does not implicate constitutional rights); United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F.
Supp. 2d 1250, 1255 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that Tapia-Mendoza "has not presented any authority or precedent
for imposing the remedy ro suppression of his statements even if, arguendo, his alleged right to consular assistance
was violated"); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 (1999) (adopting the position that
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ii. Exclusionary Rule is Available if the Text of the Treaty
Provides for It.
Courts who have found the exclusionary rule applies only if a treaty right is at
the same level as a Constitutional violation have also held that suppression would
be proper if the text of the Vienna Convention provided for that remedy.2 As
stated by the Chaparro-Alcantara court, "in order for Chaparro-Alcantara and
Romero-Bautista to invoke the exclusionary rule in this case, the Vienna
Convention must explicitly provide for that remedy, or the violation of the treaty
must rise to a level of a constitutional violation."2 35 As discussed, the courts have
found that the Treaty does not rise to a level of a constitutional violation and
"[t]hus, the suppression remedy must be available, if at all, from the Vienna
Convention itself. The Court, however, found that nothing in the Vienna
Convention that provides for the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violation of its
provisions. ' 236 The majority of courts have also agreed with the holding of the
Chapparo-Alcantara court.3 7
iii. Customary International Law and the Exclusionary Rule
Torres-Del Muro asserted that international law should govern his trial.238 The
defendant claimed that international law's customary remedy would be to restore
the status quo ante by invoking the exclusionary rule and returning the defendant
to the position he was in before the violation of his Vienna Convention rights
occurred.239 The court found that it was "questionable whether international law
"Article 36 does not create a 'fundamental' right, such as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, or the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination which originates from concepts of due process").
234. See Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
235. Id.
236. lId at 1125-26.
237. See United States v. Torres-Del Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d 931,933-94 (1999) (asserting that "in order for
Defendant to invoke the judicially created exclusionary rule in this case, the Vienna Convention must explicitly
provide for that remedy... The Court finds nothing in the text of the Vienna Convention nor its history which
manifests the signatory nations' intent to remedy violations through the exclusionary rule."); see also Tapia-
Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1255 (holding:
[the] Vienna Convention does not expressly or impliedly provide for the remedy of suppression of
statements of confessions where an arresting government fails to notify a foreign national of her right
to contact the Consulate. This court declines to imply the existence of such remedy, and rules that the
remedy of suppression is not available under the Vienna Convention.
238. See Torres-Del Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 934.
239. See id. (basing defendant's argument on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 901 cmt.
D (1987): "[o]rdinarily, emphasis is on forms of redress [for violations of treaties] that will undo the effect of the
violation, such as restoration of the status quo ante, restitution, or specific performance of an undertaking."); see
also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (6th ed.1990) (defining status quo as "the existing state of things at any
given date"); see also id. at 92 (defining ante as "before").
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should govern this case."240' The court further reasoned that even if international law
governed the case, the return to status quo ante did not necessarily have to be via
suppression. 241
b. State v. Reyes
The Reyes court is the only American court to find that suppression is a valid
remedy for a violation of the Vienna Convention. 242 The court declares that
evidence will be suppressed for the following reasons:
(1) the Vienna Convention is the law of the land under Article IV, Section
2 of the United States Constitution; (2) the police conduct in this case
violated Article 36 of the Convention; (3) Defendant, a Guatemalan citizen
has asserted a Vienna Convention violation in a timely manner; (4)
Defendant has shown adequate prejudice to exist; and (5) a violation of
Article 36 is ground for suppressing incriminating statements made by
foreign nationals while in police or government custody. 3
The Reyes court reaffirmed their position in responding to the State's motion
for Reargument. 24 The court stated that
the failure to inform a foreign national of his right under the Vienna
Convention does not automatically require that his statements be
suppressed; rather, the foreign national must demonstrate that he has
suffered some kind of cognizable prejudice.... The Court found prejudice
to exist where (1) the State conceded that Defendant was not informed of
his consular notification rights; (2) the Defendant made incriminating
statements which, (3) the State sought to introduce in its case-in-chief.2 45
240. Torres-Del Mum, 5S8 F. Supp. 2d at 934. But see Vazquez, supra note 173, at 1157-58 (declaring that
when a treaty does "not specify a remedy for failure to comply with the obligation, the default rules of customary
international law dictate"). "When a state is internationally responsible for a wrongful act, it is under an obligation
to discontinue the act and to prevent the continuing effects of the act. It is also normally under a duty to restore
the situation as it existed before the breach ... d.
241. Torres-Del Mum, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 934.
242. State v. Reyes 1, 740 A.2d 7, 14-15 (Del. 1999).
243. Id.
244. Reyes II, 1999 WL 743598 at *3.
245. Id.
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2. Other Remedies
a. Diplomatic Channels
The Rodrigues court maintains that the exclusionary rule is unavailable in a
non-constitutional matter.246 The court defends its position by stating that the State
Department has found that the signatory countries to the Vienna Convention have
found traditional diplomatic, not judicial, channels to be the proper remedy.247 The
court also emphasizes that it would be unprecedented in both the United States and
the International Community to hold that the exclusionary rule is the proper remedy
for a consular violation.248
246. See United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
247. See id. at 186 (paraphrasing the Verbatim Transcript of Oral Argument before the International Court
of Justice in the case concerning the Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.)
2.15 (Apr. 7, 1998)). The court went on to state that the proper remedy would be for a letter of protest to be sent
by the consular post who did not receive the proper notification and that the most significant action to be taken
in return is a formal apology and assurances to improve the system to prevent future violations from occurring.
IaL
248. See id. at 186-88 (emphasizing that the United States would be the first and only nation to hold that
suppression of incriminating statements is the proper remedy for the violation). The Court also analyzed the effect
this decision could have in other countries. Beginning with the accepted notion that American courts are
"precluded from drawing any negative inferences from a criminal defendant's silence at trial" the court explains
that this precept would not be found in other countries-even those with a similar protection against self-
incrimination. Even in Great Britain, "the country from whom we derive the privilege" allows its judges to make
statements concerning the defendant's silence. In Germany, a defendant's silence at trial may be considered an
aggravating factor at sentencing. In the Netherlands, the silence is considered in the factual evaluation and by
commented on by the judge and prosecutor. kL But see Mark Warren, Two precedent cases from the United
Kingdom: a breach of consular obligations warrants a judicial remedy (document on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (discussing that two British courts have excluded evidence obtained in violation of the Vienna
Convention's provisions on consular notification).
Cases that warrant exclusion are those in which the defendants' personal background might reasonably
indicate an unfamiliarity with British legal procedures and hence a perceived inability to comprehend
and act on their available legal rights. Those factors might include the defendants' command of
English, their length of stay in the United Kingdom and their familiarity with the criminal justice
system. No showing of actual prejudice was required by the courts, nor did the court appear to seek
or rely on affidavits from the consulates in question. There is no indication that the Crown appealed
these trial court decisions; they are therefore uncontested and would have precedent value.
Id.The frst case, R. v. Bassil and Mouffareg (1990) 28 July, Acton Crown Court, HHJ Sich [His Honour Judge
Sich], in Legal Action 23, December 1990, involved two Lebanese nationals who were arrested for importing
cannabis resin from Lebanon. Id. In addition to the defendants' lack of knowledge of the British criminal justice
system and their limited English language skills, the defendants are from a country where "an arrested suspect is
perceived to have no rights, or at least that it is dangerous to insist on any rights." As the arresting authorities
failed to inform the two foreign defendants of their right to consular notification and assistance, "the evidence fo
the interview should be excluded." The court noted that if officers had given the notification, a French or Arabic
speaking official would have been able to visit them and help "them to reach an informed decision about their
position, and might well have advised them to obtain the services of a solicitor and an interpreter before being
interviewed." In the second case, R. v. Van Axel and Wezer (1991) 31 May, Snaresbrook Crown Court, HHJ Sich.
Reported in Legal Action 12, September 1991, two Dutch women were arrested for importing heroin and
amphetamine sulfate from Holland. Id. The defendants were interviewed without being informed of their right to
contact their consulate. The judge, finding "that the defendants' English was reasonably good but that his might
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e. Monetary Relief
In its discussion of international remedies, the Torres-Del Muro court stated
that suppression of evidence was not the only way to return the defendant to status
quo ante.249 "Defendant might theoretically be able to seek monetary damages for
the violation of his notification rights through a Bivens action." 0 A Bivens action
is an action for damages to "vindicate constitutional right when a federal
government official has violated such right." ''
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law provides that "[u]nder
international law, a state that has violated a legal obligation to another state is
required to terminate the violation and, ordinarily, to make reparation, including in
appropriate circumstances restitution or compensation for loss or injury.' 2 The
comments to this statement reflect the generally accepted means of redress as being
status quo ante, restitution, or specific performance.23 According to one
commentator, "[c]ustomary international law should guide the courts in determining
a remedy."
Returning the status quo ante via the exclusionary rule is the appropriate
remedy for a violation of the Vienna Convention because "the purpose behind the
Article 36 notification requirement, like that of Miranda, is to make a suspect aware
be deceptive, especially since they were young people who might wish to appear more sophisticated and worldly
wise than they really were," excluded the interviews. lid
249. Torres-Del Mum, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 934.
250. Id.; see also id. at n.3 ("The Court does not hold as a matter of law that the violation of the Vienna
Convention is de facto actionable under Bivens. The Court uses the Bivens action merely as an example of an
alternate remedial scheme").
251. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that "Action is available if no equally
effective remedy is available, no explicit congressional declaration precludes recovery, and no 'special factors
counsel hesitation.' Rauschenberg v. Williamson, C.A.Ga., 785 F.2d 985, 987'). The action originated in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Defendants, 403 U.S. 388 (1999).
252. RESTATEmEN (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 901.
253. Id. Comment d specifically provides that:
All forms of reparation are designed to provide redress for the breach of the international obligation
that gave rise to the claim. Ordinarily, emphasis is on forms of redress that will undo the effect of the
violation, such as restoration of the status quo ante, restitution, or specific performance of an
undertaking. For instance, if a foreign embassy has been occupied by a mob, there is an obligation to
remove the mob and to return the embassy to its diplomatic staff; there may also be an obligation to
pay compensation for the damage to the building and to its contents, and for the injuries and indignities
suffered by the embassy's staff, Compensation is a common remedy for monetary damage, Comment
e, and in some instances compensation may be required even though no monetary damage had
occurred. Acknowledgment of a violation and an apology are common forms of redress, sometimes
supplemented by compensation. There is variety also in the remedies that may be ordered by a third
party to which a claim has been presented for resolution. Principles of international law concerning
remedies are not rigid or formalistic and give an international tribunal wide latitude to develop and
shape remedies, but the tribunal is usually restricted to measures proposed by the parties.
Id.
254. See Kaddish, supra note 8, at 609.
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of his rights before he unknowingly waives those rights.' ' 5 When a defendant
properly raises the Vienna Convention violation, as Reyes did, the court should
suppress the evidence because not doing so will harm the defendant's trial. 56
VI. CONCLUSION
With all of the division in the lower federal courts and state courts as to how to
properly apply the Vienna Convention, a United States Supreme Court ruling is
needed to finally set forth the place of the Vienna Convention in American
jurisprudence. It is time that the United States started fulfilling its international
obligations. 
2 7
The language of the Vienna Convention, along with the intent of the drafters,
demonstrates that the Vienna Convention confers a private right of action upon
individuals. When a foreign defendant meets the requirements set forth by the
American courts-timely invocation of the Vienna Convention and a demonstration
of prejudice-the Courts should suppress the evidence and return the defendant to
status quo ante as demanded by international law.
One of the largest consequences of the United States' failure to abide by their
treaty obligations is that it puts Americans at risk. The American government can
no longer continue to violate international law and expect its nationals to be
protected overseas. Furthermore, its actions condone violations by other countries.
As stated by the Canadian amicus brief in the Stanley Faulder case:
Because it forms part of the body of legal precedent on the point, the denial
of notification and of an effective remedy in this case undermine the
sovereign power of all parties to the Vienna Convention-including the
United States-to invoke the Convention to protect their nationals who are
arrested or detained abroad. Worse, it condones noncompliance. The failure
of the United States to honor its obligations under article 36 may be cited
by other countries as evidence of accepted international practice when such
states are faced with deciding whether to give notice, or provide a remedy
255. Id. at 611 (finding that because of this, "full effect cannot be given to the Article once a foreign
national has been convicted in violation of its provision unless a new trial is granted").
256. See Canadian Amicus, supra note 8, at 54-56 (arguing that in a case like Faulder's, where the
defendant has gone through a trial already, the harm inflicted by the failure to provide consular assistance "in the
early stages of a prisoner's arrest infects the process that follows, destroying the fundamental fairness and truth-
seeking function of the subsequent trial').
257. See David Cole, The U.S. Plays by its Own Rules: As a Nation, We View International Law in Wholly
Instrumental Terms, Tex. Law., May 11, 1998, at 28. "when it comes to Cuba's record on human rights, Japan's
trade practices or Iraq's compliance with treaties on chemical weapons, the United States is a staunch proponent
of international law. But when the tables are turned and we're accused of violating international law, we couldn't
care less." Id.
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for non-notification, in cases involving detention of foreign nationals
within their jurisdiction.258
This concern is echoed in the words of Justice Butzner,
United States citizens are scattered about the world - as missionaries, Peace
Corps volunteers, doctors, teachers and students, as travelers for business
and for pleasure. Their freedom and safety are seriously endangered if state
officials fail to honor the Vienna Convention and other nations follow their
example. Public officials should bear in mind that 'international law is
founded upon mutuality and reciprocity .... 259
Mexico has taken preventive measures to protect Mexican nationals in the
United States. The Consul for the United Mexican States created a wallet sized card
that contains the rights embodied in the Vienna Convention as well as those
contained in American jurisprudence such as the right to an attorney and the right
to remain silent. Hopefully, this will prevent further violations of the rights of
Mexican nationals in the United States.
Figure 1 (Frontside of Card)
258. Canadian Arnicus, supra note 8, at 31.
259. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring), quoting Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895).
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260
Si ers detenido p r cualquerautoddad y por cualquermo, EXIGE el catminento
de los siguientes derechos:
1. Tenes deretoa PERMANECER CALLADO. puesdo bquscdgspodtua oentu
con- (sdo debes dar himm ydmico).
2. Teesd e a sofidtw un 'apr que ssmpre.a0nnoms dmto.Nodedaes
nadayslock 'I WANTTO SPA T ALAWYER(Xkiwhabrvoom o)Adc i
es, el 0ofl qu I de uvo & debe wspenderl ki .labb. p eieh  loo iqnvgw
sk La pwsenadao Lin aboado.
3. Tiaes demh acmnu*ade con l CONSULADQ Enal stbdeaua btalnnaia
los te bns de los Caosiados de MW= en Es Urkb
NADADEESTO TELOPJE INEGARTfth fi y morl y la de lu frik
deben ser esetadas, AUN SI 7E EVNCU ,A1NDOCUMErTADO W EEPAIS
Por ota parte RECUERDATAMBIE:
B Ew dOmendoaos o aom= def e9o e smvairwbpotb ly.
N r manejes en eI' de eledad, sin kend o umsdd am5-n
*No ftmies doomnerdeSOBRETOOSESTAJN1MLE% i dapdl
Figure 2 (Backside of Card)
It is unfortunate that Mexico had to resort to these measures to ensure that their
citizens are protected because Mexico cannot rely on the United States to uphold
their treaty obligations.
Until the time comes when America fulfills their international obligations, the
best weapon to combating the violation of the Vienna Convention is awareness.
Hopefully, other nations will follow Mexico's lead in informing their nationals of
their rights under the Vienna Convention. Here in America, while the rights of
foreign defendants are still violated, it is the role of the defense attorney to ensure
that their foreign clients were informed of their right to contact their consulate.
260. Translation of Card by author
If you are detained for any reason, know the follow rights:
1. You have the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against you (just give
your name and address).
2. You have the right to request an attorney to represent you, even if you do not have the money. Only
say "I want to speak to a lawyer." When you say this, the official that has detained you must stop the
interrogation, because it is illegal to continue without your lawyer.
3. You have the right to contact your consulate. On this card, you will find the phone numbers for
the Mexican Consulates in the United States.
None of these rights can be denied. Your mental and physical integrity and that of your family should
be respected, even if you do not have papers.
Also remember.
* If you have illegal documents or weapons, you may face serious penalty through the law.
* Do not drive in the U.S. without a license or documents for your automobile.
• Do not sign anything in English without consulting your lawyer or consulate.

